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Abstract
Two original contributions are made which extend the GraphModel for Conflict Resolution:
one is a new family of solution concepts, while the other is a novel methodological approach.
In addition to theoretical contributions, applications to complex energy problems are demon-
strated; in particular, the consideration of the ongoing Trans Mountain Expansion Project is
the first of its kind.
The family of solution concepts, called initial state stabilities, is designed to complement
existing solution concepts within the GraphModel framework by modelling both risk-averse
and risk-seeking decision-makers. The comparison which underpins these concepts examines
the consequences of moving from a given starting state to those of remaining in that state. The
types of individuals modelled by these stability concepts represent a new class of decision-
makers which, up until now, had not been considered in the GraphModel paradigm.
The innovative methodology presented is designed to "inverse engineer" decision-makers’
preferences based on their observable behaviour. The algorithms underlying the inverse
engineering methodology are based on the most commonly used stability concepts in the
GraphModel for Conflict Resolution and function by reducing the set of possible preference
rankings for each decision-maker. The reduction is based on observable moves and counter-
moves made by decision-makers. This procedure assists stakeholders in optimizing their own
decision-making process based on information gathered about their opponents and can also
be used to improve the modelling of strategic interactions.
In addition to providing decision-makers and analysts with up-to-date preference inform-
ation about opponents, the methodology is also equipped with an ADVICE function which
enriches the decision-making process by providing important information regarding potential
moves. Decision-makers who use the methods introduced in this thesis are provided with
the expected value of each of their possible moves, with the probability of the opponent’s
next response, and with the opponent reachable states. This insightful data helps establish an
accurate picture of the conflict situation and in so doing, aids stakeholders in making strategic
decisions. The applicability of this methodology is demonstrated through the study of the
conflict surrounding the Trans Mountain Expansion Project in British Columbia, Canada.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Strategic interactions among decision-makers (DMs) are common to a wide variety of contexts
including economics, evolutionary biology, operations research, negotiations, and military
science. Game theory is the study of such interactions; it provides a rich array of mathematical
tools to model, analyse, and predict possible resolutions to conflicts. Since its formal introduc-
tion in the book by von Neumann andMorgenstern 1944, classical game theory has seenmany
of its original assumptions re-examined and re-evaluated. The notion of perfect rationality has
ceded ground to that of bounded rationality (Simon 1957; Conlisk 1996); a “static" approach
has given way to a dynamic, time dependent one (Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003).
Modern approaches are based on evolutionary game theory which combines bounded
rationality with dynamics to analyse conflicts and their evolution (Perc et al. 2013; Szabo and
Fath 2007). Recent developments in evolutionary game theory include multi-games, in which
each DM in a population has different payoffs (Wardil and da Silva 2013; Hashimoto 2014), as
well as graph and network approaches in which social networks and spatial games are often
represented using graph or lattice structures with edge weights representing utilities (Nowak,
Bonhoeffer andMay 1994; Roca, Cuesta and Sanches 2009; Galeotti et al. 2010; Perc 2014).
As is detailed in Chapter 2, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Graph Model, for
short) is a game-theoretic methodology which provides insights based on a conflict’s main
DMs, their respective options which are used to define the set of conflict states, and their
respective preferences over the set of states. The GraphModel provides the bedrock for this
research, which interrogates and examines some of its fundamental assumptions.
1.1 Motivation
This research is motivated by twomain questions. The first, “What are other ways to define
stability for a state?", looksbeyond the typical solutionconceptsused in theGraphModel. While
they provide valuable information and analysis, the most commonly used solution concepts 1
are calculated based on the same comparison of the state of interest to the state(s) resulting
from a sequence of DMmoves and countermoves. Given this observation, the introduction of
diversity in solution concept calculation is particularly relevant as distinct solution concepts
1The commonly used solution concepts are Nash, General Metarational, Symmetric Metarational, and Sequen-
tial stabilities, which are explained in more detail in Chapter 2.
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personify different types of DMs. A thorough GraphModel analysis of a conflict would do well
to model a variety of DM types in order to provide valuable insights. Enriching the suite of
solution concepts available to users of the GraphModel thus requires conceptualizing a novel
state comparison method.
The second question asks “What can one do if one has no preference information about
DMs?". As users of the Graph Model know, preferences are a key ingredient in building a
credible model of the conflict; however, preference information for DMsmay be difficult to
come by. Opponents may not want to divulge their preferences to other DMs or to analysts in
order to preserve a strategic advantage. For those studying historial conflicts, finding sufficient
information to build an accurate preference picture of those involved may be difficult to
achieve.
1.2 Research Objectives
In light of the twomotivating questions highlighted above, the research objectives can be di-
vided into two groups, each corresponding to one of the questions. The first group of objectives
is motivated by the goal of expanding the list of existing solution concepts:
• Determine an alternate method of comparing states
• Based on the above comparison method, develop a family of solution concepts to model
a new type of DM
The next group of objectives is designed to address the second question regarding the lack
of preference information. The approach “inverse engineers" a DM’s preferences based on
their observable moves, and has the following objectives:
• Develop a methodology and algorithms to determine a DM’s preferences based on the
behaviour they exhibit
• Enhance the above methodology to provide information which is useful for real-time
decision-making
An objective shared by both questions is to demonstrate the validity and applicability of
the new solution concepts and methods using real-world case studies.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
This thesis is organized into six chapters, as shown in Figure 1.1. The introductory chapter,
Chapter 1, provides the motivation for the research and outlines the research objectives.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the historical development of the GraphModel and details the
twomain stages which constitute the application of the GraphModel.
Thefirstmotivating question (denotedbyQuestion 1 in Figure 1.1) is addressed inChapter 3,
which introduces a new family of solution concepts, called initial state stabilities, whose
calculations differ from typical Graph Model solution concepts. Theoretical results linking the
new solution concepts to GraphModel concepts are stated and proved. Finally, a case study is
2
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used to demonstrate how these solution concepts are applied to real-world disputes and how
they compliment existing solution concepts.
The second motivating question (denoted by Question 2 in Figure 1.1) is explored in
Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 proposes to answer the question via an innovative methodology
and algorithms designed to inverse engineer a DM’s preferences based on their observable
actions. Beginning with a philosophical reflection on the nature of the approach, the chapter
then moves on to review some of the relevant literature regarding the study of preferences in
the GraphModel. Next, the necessary concepts underpinning the algorithms are explained,
following which the algorithms and the ADVICE function are detailed. The final section in the
chapter illustrates the previously introduced methodology using a simple 2-DM case study.
Chapter 5 applies themethods from Chapter 4 to an ongoing pipeline construction conflict
which is currently taking place in Alberta, Canada. The conflict, its main DMs, and points
of contention are described, following which the inverse engineering model is constructed.
Based on the results of the analysis, the strategic insights imparted by the newmethodology are
emphasized. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the main contributions of this work and suggests
new research avenues.
3
1.3. Organization of Thesis
Figure 1.1: Organization of the thesis
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Chapter 2
The GraphModel for Conflict Resolution
Traditionally, DM preferences are modelled with utility functions. Such functions are meant to
capture the benefit (utility) that each DM derives from a particular state or outcome; many
approaches seek to maximise the utility functions of the DM(s) in question. Cardinal utilities
and preferences can, however, be replaced by ordinal preferences in which states are pairwise
ranked and compared.
Relative preferences have some advantages over cardinal ones. First, relative preference
statements such as "I prefer tea to coffee" are more reflective of how people think of and
describe their own preferences; one is unlikely to encounter an individual who would state "I
prefer tea 2.8 times to coffee". By noting only the DM’s ranking of items (tea > coffee) rather
than the ranking and a metric (tea = 2.8 coffee), ordinal preferences avoid the problems of
trying to determine a precise utility for each item and of performing interpersonal comparisons
of utility. Such comparisons are by nature quite difficult since it is not clear what the "exchange
rate" is between one individual’s unit of utility and another’s.
Second, relative preferences allow for intransitivity in preference statements, a common
occurrence which nevertheless is precluded by utility functions since modelling preferences
with utility functions requires that they be transitive, complete, andmonotone. Intransitive
preferences occur when three or more items or statements are being compared and "cycles"
in preferences occur. For example, an individual may prefer tea to coffee, coffee to juice, but
juice to tea.
The GraphModel is a well-knownmethodology for analysing complex conflicts involving
several DMs which uses ordinal preferences. This methodology analyses DM moves and
counter-moves in order to provide strategic insights and to predict possible resolutions of the
conflict under study.
2.1 A Brief History of the GraphModel
The GraphModel finds its roots in metagame theory which was pioneered by Nigel Howard
(Howard 1971). This non-quantitative approach is based on the analysis of options at the
disposal of stakeholders and is meant as a more practical and intuitive answer to the rigidity
of classical game theory. Rather than working with utility functions and cardinal preferences,
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metagame analysis focuses on the possible outcomes of a conflict and on which DMs can
influence them.
Further work in this field by Fraser, Hipel, Kilgour, and Fang resulted in the development
of conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel 1979; Fraser and Hipel 1984) and, eventually, of the
GraphModel (Kilgour, Hipel and Fang 1987; Fang, Hipel and Kilgour 1993). These techniques
expanded the scope and applicability of metagame theory by developing a systematic, op-
erationalised way to analyse conflicts and by introducing several new and valuable solution
concepts. A decision support system (DSS), GMCR II, was eventually developed to facilitate
GraphModel calculations (Fang et al. 2003b; Fang et al. 2003a).
Parallel progress in metagame analysis also included the development of drama theory,
which uses the metaphor of theatre to analyse the dynamics of multi-DM conflicts. The
conflicts, viewed through the lens of theatre, undergo phases of scene-setting, build-up, climax,
decision, and denouement (Howard 1999; Bryant 2015).
Since the introduction of the Graph Model in the late 1980s, many enhancements and
improvements have beenmade. Notable examples include thematrix formulation of theGraph
Model which uses matrix operations to greatly simplify stability calculations (Xu, Hipel and
Kilgour 2009a; Xu, Li et al. 2009) and coalition analysis which examines potential resolutions
based on cooperation among DMs (Inohara and Hipel 2008)1.
The GraphModel’s robust and relevant results, coupled with its ease of use with decision
support systems such as GMCR II and GMCR + (Kinsara, Petersons et al. 2015), have made
it a popular methodology to study a wide range of conflicts. Most recently, the GraphModel
has been used to analyse energy conflicts (Garcia, Obeidi and Hipel 2016; Matbouli, Hipel and
Kilgour 2014); water conflicts (Hipel, Kilgour and Kinsara 2014; Philpot, Hipel and Johnson
2016; He, Kilgour andHipel 2016); and environmental disputes (Bashar, Hipel andKilgour 2012;
Madani 2013). Advancing and improving the GraphModel remains a lively, multi-disciplinary
research area to this day.
2.2 Procedure
The Graph Model procedure is executed in two broad steps: modelling and analysis. The
general Graph Model procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which is adapted from (Fang, Hipel
and Kilgour 1993; Xu, Hipel, Kilgour and Fang 2018). In the next sections, the procedures are
reviewed and essential definitions and notation are provided.
2.2.1 Modelling
In the modelling phase, the relevant conflict parameters are determined and/or calculated.
First, the DMs are identified. DMs are individuals or groups with decision-making power and
who have a direct influence on the conflict. The set of DMs is denoted byN = {1, 2, . . . , n} with
n being the total number of DMs and each DM being arbitrarily assigned a unique numerical
identifier.
Next, the set of options for each DM is identified. Options are binary; by convention, an
option which has been chosen is denoted by a 1, while an option which has not been selected
1GraphModel extensions pertinent to the work presented in this thesis will be detailed in Chapter 4.
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Figure 2.1: The GraphModel Procedure
Real-world conflict
Decision-makers
Options
Feasible states
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Modeling
Analysis
is denoted by a 0. Each DM i ∈ N has a setOi of options, with oi j denoting DM i ’s j th option.
The set of all options in a conflict isO = ∪i ∈NOi . During the conflict, DMsmove among their
strategies, selecting and un-selecting the options at their disposal.
Definition 2.1. A strategy for DM i is a mapping g : Oi → {0, 1} such that
g (oi j ) =
{
1 if DM i selects option oi j
0 otherwise
A DM’s strategy is simply an assignment of 0/1 to each of that DM’s options. Combining
fixed strategies from all of the DMs results in a conflict state.
Definition 2.2. A state is a mapping f : O → {0, 1} such that
f (oi j ) =
{
1 if DM i selects option oi j for i = 1, 2, . . . n
0 otherwise
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Table 2.1: Types of Infeasible States
Type of infeasibility Example
Logical infeasibility for one DM Mutually exclusive options: building a pro-
ject and not building a project
Preferential infeasibility for one DM States which involve a strategy selection by
a DMwhich they would not be expected to
take: a review commission choosing not to
make recommendations
Logical infeasibility among a subset of DMs DMs vying for an indivisible resource: a
house in a divorce settlement
Preferential infeasibility among a subset of
DMs
Preferentially infeasible outcomes for at least
one DMwhich involve strategy choices by at
least two DMs: a DM will let an opponent
commit a legal infractionwithout taking legal
action
A conflict with |O | = m options has 2m possible states; however, not all of these may be
feasible. Removing infeasible states is thus the next step in the modelling phase. A state may
be removed for one of four reasons; the types of infeasible states are summarized in Table 2.1
Once infeasible states have been removed, only feasible states remain. The set of feasible
states is denoted by S = {1, 2, . . . , s } and represents outcomes of the conflict under study that
could realistically occur. It is quite common for conflicts having a large number of possible
states to be reduced to less than 100 (often less than 50) feasible states.
Next, allowable state transitions are determined. Moves among states may be either revers-
ible or irreversible. In the former case, a move to state sk ∈ S can be done or undone; in the
latter case, a move to state sj ∈ S cannot be undone.
The final modelling step consists in developing a preference ranking for each DM; that is, a
ranking of the feasible states frommost to least preferred. Preference rankings can be determ-
ined through direct consultation with DMs or through historical investigation as necessary.
A simple, binary preference structure is used to express preference rankings in the standard
GraphModel2: the relation sk i sj indicates that state sk is preferred by DM i to state sj , while
sk ∼i sj means that states sk and sj are equally preferred by DM i . The set of relations {≺i, ∼i } is
complete: any two states can be compared by a DMwho will either prefer one over the other
or prefer them equally.3
One of the advantages of the GraphModel lies in its capacity to accommodate a rich set of
preference types, including both transitive and intransitive preferences. In the former case,
this means that the ranking satisfies the assumption of transitivity which states that if sk ≺i sj
and sj ≺i sl , then it must be that sk ≺i sl . In the latter case, a DM’s preference ranking does
2Many other preference structures have been developed and will be discussed in Chapter 4.
3In this context, "or" is understood as an exclusive or: the DMcannot affirmboth or neither of these statements.
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not satisfy the above condition. It is therefore possible to have preference “cycles" such that
sk ≺i sj , sj ≺i sl , and sl ≺i sk .
Given the DMs, their options, the set of feasible states, allowable transitions, and DMs’
preferences, the GraphModel of the conflict can be formed. The conflict is modelled as a set
of finite directed graphsDi = (S, Ai )with i ∈ N where the set of vertices is given by the states
and an arc a ∈ Ai between vertices sk and sj indicates that DM i can unilaterally move from
state sk to state sj in one step. For an n-DM conflict with n ≥ 2, the Graph Model illustrates the
conflict as a set of finite directed graphs in which vertices represent feasible states and arcs
depict moves controlled by DMs.
2.2.2 Analysis
Once the model is formed, one can proceed to the analysis phase. Here, the information
provided in the modelling phase is used to determine likely outcomes of the conflict as well as
its possible evolution from a status quo state. Broadly, states are examined for stability at the
individual DM level, at the coalition level, and at the conflict level using a variety of solution
concepts. A stable state is one from which there is no incentive to move away; states which are
stable under a given solution concept for all DMs are called equilibrium states and represent
possible resolutions of the conflict.4
Solution concepts (also commonly referred to as stability concepts) represent different
behavioural profiles that could apply to the DMs. The choice to use one solution concept over
another depends on whether the focal DM is willing to accept risk, has knowledge of their
opponents’ preferences, and howmuch foresight is to be considered. Analysts and DMsmay
use one or more solution concepts when analysing a conflict to examine how the choice of
solution concept can affect the equilibrium results.
In order to define the solution concepts used in the GraphModel, some preliminary nota-
tions and definitions are required. First, the sets of unilateral moves and unilateral improve-
ments:
Definition 2.3. The set of unilateral moves (UMs) for DM i from state sk ∈ S is given by
Ri (sk ) = {sj : sk sj ∈ Ai }. In words, Ri (sk ) denotes the set of states that DM i can unilaterally
reach in one step from state sk ∈ S .
Definition 2.4. The set of unilateral improvements (UIs) for DM i from state sk ∈ S is given by
R+i (sk ) = {sj : sj ∈ Ri (sk ) and sk ≺i sj }. In words, R+i (sk ) denotes the set of states that DM i can
unilaterally reach in one step from state sk ∈ S and that are more preferred to state sk .
UMs and UIs provide information on which states are reachable from a given starting state
by each DM and, in the case of UIs, which of these reachable states are improvements from
the starting state. UMs and UIs are the basic DMmovements which are at the heart of solution
concepts.
In n-DM conflicts, one can define UMs for subsets of DMs. A non-empty subset H ⊆ N
is called a coalition. Coalition UMs are defined as sequences of moves in which DMs in the
coalition may move more than once, but not twice consecutively (Fang, Hipel and Kilgour
4The term "resolutions" is used in the broad sense of "outcomes"; a resolution to a conflict need not please all
DMs.
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1993; Xu, Kilgour et al. 2014). The notationΩH (s, s1) ⊆ N denotes the set of all last DMs in legal
sequences from s to s1.
Definition 2.5. For s ∈ S , H ⊆ N a non-empty subset of DMs, and assuming ΩH (s, s1) = ∅ to
start, a unilateral move by coalitionH is a member of RH (s ) ⊆ S , defined inductively by:
(1) if j ∈ H and s1 ∈ R j (s ), then s1 ∈ RH (s ), and ΩH (s, s1) = ΩH (s, s1) ∪ {j };
(2) if j ∈ H , s1 ∈ RH (s ), s2 ∈ R j (s1), then provided ΩH (s, s1) , {j }, s2 ∈ RH (s ) and ΩH (s, s2) =
ΩH (s, s2) ∪ {j }.
According to (1) in Definition 2.5, all the reachable states from s are identified and added to
RH (s ) and DM j is added to ΩH (s, s1), the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1. At
(2), all states reachable from the states identified in (1) are identified and also added to RH (s )
provided that the DMsmoving to these states are not the only DMs in the set of last movers
ΩH (s, s1). The process is repeated from (2) until there are no more states to add to RH (s ). The
set RH (s ) thus contains the states that the conflict could reach from the starting state s if only
the DMs inH are allowed to move. The definition for UIs for sets of DMs is analogous; R(s ) is
simply replaced by R+(s ):
Definition 2.6. For s ∈ S , H ⊆ N a non-empty subset of DMs, and assuming Ω+H (s, s1) = ∅ to
start, a unilateral improvement by coalitionH is a member of R+H (s ) ⊆ S , defined inductively by:
(1) if j ∈ H and s1 ∈ R+j (s ), then s1 ∈ R+H (s ), and Ω+H (s, s1) = Ω+H (s, s1) ∪ {j };
(2) if j ∈ H , s1 ∈ RH (s ), s2 ∈ R j (s1), then provided Ω+H (s, s1) , {j }, s2 ∈ RH (s ) and Ω+H (s, s2) =
Ω+H (s, s2) ∪ {j }.
Thenotions of states, preferences, UMs, andUIs are used todefine several solution concepts
in the Graph Model, the most common of which are summarized in Table 2.2 and defined
below. In the following definitions, the notation N − i denotes the set of DMs excluding DM i .
Definition 2.7. A state sk ∈ S isNash stable for DM i ∈ N if and only if (iff) R+i (sk ) = ∅. In words,
a state is Nash stable (R) if there is no available UI for the DM (Fraser and Hipel 1979).
At aNash stable state, theDMhas no incentive tomove away since there are no availableUIs.
The Nash stable state is the best state that the DM can achieve, assuming that the opponents’
strategies remain fixed.
Definition 2.8. A state sk ∈ S is general metarational (GMR) stable for DM i ∈ N iff for every
s ∈ R+i (sk ) there exists at least one state sx ∈ RN−i (s )with sx -i sk (Fraser and Hipel 1979) .
In words, a state sk is GMR stable for DM i if for every UI available to DM i , there is a state
in the coalition UMs by the other DMs which is less than or equally preferred by i to sk . DM i is
guarding against the possibility thatmoving to a UI could potentially result in a worse outcome
than simply staying put.
Definition 2.9. A state sk ∈ S is sequentially (SEQ) stable for DM i ∈ N iff for every s ∈ R+i (sk )
there exists at least one state sx ∈ R+N−i (s )with sx -i sk (Fraser and Hipel 1979; Fraser and Hipel
1984).
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A state sk is SEQ stable for DM i if for every UI available to DM i , there is a state in the
coalition UIs by the other DMs which is less than or equally preferred by i to sk . SEQ stability
and GMR stability are similar but for the fact that SEQ stability requires knowledge of the
opponents’ preferences. While GMR stability is concerned with opponent UMs, SEQ stability
deals with opponent UIs.
Definition 2.10. A state sk ∈ S is symmetric metarational (SMR) stable for DM i ∈ N iff for
every s ∈ R+i (sk ) there exists at least one state sx ∈ RN−i (s ) with sx -i sk and for all sy ∈ Ri (sx ),
sy -i sk (Fraser and Hipel 1979).
In other words, a state sk is SMR stable for DM i if for every UI available to DM i , there is
a state sx in the coalition UM by the other DMs which is less than or equally preferred by i
to sk and any UM by i from sx is less than or equally preferred by i to sk . DM i is anticipating
that it will have the opportunity to respond to the opponents’ counter-move. At SMR stable
states, DM i ’s response still does not result in escaping the sanction which could potentially be
imposed by the opponents.
Table 2.2: Summary of GraphModel solution concepts for a state sk ∈ S for DM i ∈ N
Solution Concept Definition
Nash Stability (R) R+i (sk ) = ∅.
General Metarational
(GMR)
∀s ∈ R+i (sk ) ∃sx ∈ RN−i (s )with sx -i sk .
Sequential Stability (SEQ) ∀s ∈ R+i (sk ) ∃sx ∈ R+N−i (s )with sx -i sk .
Symmetric Metarational
(SMR)
∀s ∈ R+i (sk ) ∃sx ∈ RN−i (s )with sx -i sk and ∀sy ∈ Ri (sx ), sy -i sk .
Other solution concepts such as limited move stability (Fang, Hipel and Kilgour 1993),
non-myopic stability (Brams and Wittman 1981), and symmetric sequential stability (Rego
and Vieira 2017) exist; however, the most commonly used solution concepts in a GraphModel
analysis are Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ stabilities. Table 2.3, adapted from (Kilgour, Hipel and
Fang 1987), describes important characteristics of each of the solution concepts presented
above and also shows the different behavioural profiles associated to each solution concept.
One can see that Nash stability looks only one step ahead and is risk averse in the sense that
it does not consider possible opponent counter-moves but focuses on moving to a state which
cannot be improved upon at the point in time of interest. Next, GMR and SEQ stabilities look
two steps into the future: the DM’s initial move to a UI and possible opponent counter-moves.
For GMR stability, no knowledge of opponent preferences is assumed; equivalently, one could
assume that opponents may be willing to accept a disimprovement in order to punish the
DM. SEQ stability, however, requires knowledge of the opponent’s preferences and assumes
that opponents will not accept disimprovements. Finally, SMR stability looks yet another step
ahead by allowing the DM to respond to opponent counter-moves.
Once stabilities have been calculated for each individual DM, conflict equilibria can be
found. Recall that a state which is stable under a particular solution concept for all DMs is an
equilibrium for that solution concept. Thus, a Nash equilibrium is a state which is Nash stable
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for all DMs and similarly for the other solution concepts. Equilibrium states provide DMs and
analysts with possible resolutions of the conflict.
Stabilities are also calculated for coalitions of DMs. Coalition analysis provides additional
insights on possible resolutions by examining whether DMs could cooperate and, in so doing,
reach a more preferred resolution than could be reached if they operated individually (Xu,
Kilgour et al. 2014). This analysis also reveals which equilibria are susceptible to shifts (some-
times called equilibrium jumps) by coalitions of DMs.
It is also common to perform sensitivity analysis in which conflict parameters are slightly
perturbed to determine the robustness of the initial analysis results. Sensitivity analysis ex-
amines "What if?" scenarios and allows one to see how sensitive the equilibria are to changes
in DMs, preferences, and options. Once analysis has been performed, the information and
insights are used to help DMs and analysts make better decisions about the conflict situation.
Table 2.3: Solution Concepts and Human Behaviour
Solution
Concept
Description Foresight Knowledge
of Prefer-
ences
Dis-
improve-
ment
Risk
Nash DM cannot
unilaterally
move to a more
preferred state
Low Own Never Ignores risk
GMR All the DM’s UIs
are sanctioned
by opponent
UMs
Medium Own By oppon-
ents
Conservative
SEQ All the DM’s UIs
are sanctioned
by opponent
UIs
Medium All Never Some risk
SMR All the DM’s UIs
are sanctioned
by opponent
UMs, even
after the DM
responds
Medium Own By oppon-
ents
Conservative
2.3 Extensions to the GraphModel
Beyond the basic GraphModel procedure discussed in Section 2.2, many new extensions and
approaches have been developed over the years. This section briefly summarizes some of the
extensions to the GraphModel, grouped by topic.
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2.3.1 Evolution of a Conflict
Since the GraphModel typically analyses a conflict at a fixed point in time, it is common to
track its evolution usingmethods such as status quo analysis (Li, Kilgour andHipel 2005). Shifts
in conflict equilibria due to changes in the DMs’ preferences are studied using robustness of
equilibriamethods (Matbouli, Kilgour and Hipel 2015). The length of time that a DM remains
in a given state can be examined using a state transition time analysis (Inohara 2016).
2.3.2 Inverse GMCR
As its name implies, this approach reverses some of the main steps in the GraphModel. Rather
thanpredicting equilibrium states, the inverseGMCRbegins by selecting the desired resolution,
then determines which preferences are necessary to achieve it (Kinsara, Kilgour and Hipel
2014; Kinsara, Petersons et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2018).
2.3.3 Power
Power imbalances and asymmetries often occur in conflicts. Hierarchical graphmodels are
designed to study DMs which are involved in more than one dispute andmay have differing
levels of power in each (He, Kilgour, Hipel and Bashar 2013; He, Kilgour and Hipel 2016). The
study of power asymmetry in a conflict examines how a more powerful DMmay be able to
influence the preferences of the others by virtue of its privileged position (Yu et al. 2015).
2.3.4 Preference Structures
In this category are grouped different approaches to defining the preference relations used
by DMs when ranking the conflict states. Fuzzy preferences (Bashar, Kilgour and Hipel 2014;
Bashar, Hipel and Kilgour 2012), grey preferences (Kuang et al. 2015; Han, Nguyen and Xu 2013),
probabilistic preferences (Rego and dos Santos 2015), and strength of preferences (Xu, Hipel and
Kilgour 2009b; Hamouda, Kilgour and Hipel 2006) each define new sets of preference relations
based on their chosen mathematical structure. Rather than the standard set {≺i, ∼i }, a more
nuanced approach which allows for degrees of preference is introduced.
2.3.5 Preference Elicitation
These extensions focus onways inwhich to developpreference rankings forDMs.Multi-criteria
methods (Ke, Fu et al. 2012) use existingmulti-criteria techniques and apply them to the Graph
Model framework. More recently, value-focused approaches propose ways to link aDM’s values
with their preference ranking (Bristow, Fang and Hipel 2014; Philpot, Hipel and Johnson 2017).
2.3.6 Psychological Factors
Extensions in this vein seek to incorporate psychological factors which can influence decision-
making into the Graph Model. Work on attitudes examines how a DM’s attitude (positive,
negative, neutral) toward themselves and other DMs can affect the conflict outcomes (S. B.
Walker, Hipel and Inohara 2009; S. Walker, Hipel and Inohara 2012). Accounting for the
role of emotions in a conflict examines the important role that emotions play in how a DM
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conceptualizes the dispute (Obeidi, Hipel and Kilgour 2005; Obeidi, Kilgour and Hipel 2005).
Finally, hypergamesmodel howmisperceptions with respect to the DMs, the conflict states,
preferences, or any combination of the above can affect a conflict’s outcome (Aljefri, Hipel and
Fang 2018).
2.3.7 Matrix Methods
The matrix representation of the Graph Model uses matrices and their operations to both
represent a conflict and to calculate its equilibria (Xu, Li et al. 2009; Xu,Hipel andKilgour 2009a).
Over the years, many of the extensions previously mentioned, including coalition analysis (Xu,
Kilgour et al. 2014), attitudes (S. B. Walker, Hipel and Xu 2013), uncertain preferences (Xu,
Hipel, Kilgour and Chen 2010), grey preferences (Han, Nguyen and Xu 2013), and the inverse
GraphModel (Wang et al. 2018) have been expressed using a matrix representation.
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed the Graph Model’s historical origins and outlined the Graph Model
procedure, which is executed in two phases. Themodelling phase consist in selecting the DMs,
their options, removing infeasible states, and formulating preference rankings for each DM. In
the analysis phase, both individual and coalition stabilities are determined, the equilibria are
calculated, followed by sensitivity analysis and interpretation.
Finally, many of the extensions to the GraphModel were summarised. The extensions were
grouped by topic and included the study of the evolution of a conflict, inverse GMCR, the role
of power, diversity in preference structures and preference elicitation, psychological factors,
and matrix methods.
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Initial State Stabilities
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Graph Model requires three "ingredients" to model a
conflict: DMs, each DM’s options, and each DM’s preferences over the set of states. Using this
information, one is able to analyse the conflict and find stable states; that is, states from which
a DM does not want to move away. The stability of a particular state is always determined with
respect to a particular solution concept (also called stability concept). Solution concepts are
designed tomathematically express howDMs, with varying levels of risk aversion and foresight,
behave in strategic interactions. A standard application of the GraphModel methodology to
a conflict typically verifies four types of solution concepts: Nash, GMR, SEQ, and SMR (see
Chapter 2 for details on these solution concepts).
A common research approachwithin theGraphModel is to apply anewpreference structure
and derive the corresponding version of the four core solution concepts (see Bashar, Obeidi
et al. 2016 for an example). Although these approaches do lead to new solution concepts, they
remain variations on the core solution concepts and as such retain their general properties
with respect to risk aversion and foresight.
Research into developing new GraphModel solution concepts has generally been limited.
A decade ago, a series of papers introduced a generalization of general metarational and
sequential stabilities (Zeng et al. 2005; Zeng et al. 2006; Zeng et al. 2007). More recently, a
new solution concept, symmetric sequential stability, was introduced to expand the foresight
of sequential stability (Rego and Vieira 2017). Both of these efforts generated new solution
concepts which grew from the core stability concept definitions.
As the literature suggests, analysing a conflict with an enriched set of solution concepts
can yield more valuable results to analysts, who gain additional insights into possible conflict
resolutions. Since solution concepts are meant to simulate DM behaviour, states which are
equilibria under a large number of solution concepts (i.e., under a large number of possible
behaviours) may bemore likely resolutions of the conflict (Madani 2013; Madani and Hipel
2011; Kilgour and Eden 2010; Kilgour, Hipel, Fang and Peng 2001). The work presented in
this chapter thus seeks to complement and expand the range of solutions concepts currently
available within the GraphModel framework.
A family of four new solution concepts based on the concept of initial states is introduced.
The types of individuals modelled by these stability concepts represent a new class of DM
which, up until now, had not been considered in the Graph Model paradigm. As will be shown,
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sk
st ∈
R+i (sk )
su ∈
R+i (sk )
RN−i (st )RN−i (su )
Figure 3.1: Comparison for GraphModel stabilities
the considerations and calculations made with the new solution concepts reflect a different
comparison process.
3.1 Stabilities in the GraphModel
The most commonly used GraphModel solution concepts which take into account opponent
moves (GMR, SMR, and SEQ) calculate stability in a similar manner: the general idea is to
compare some starting state sk to states in RN−i (s ) (or in R+N−i (s )) with s ∈ R+i (sk ). If for all
s ∈ R+i (sk ) any sx ∈ RN−i (s ) (or sx ∈ R+N−i (s )) is less preferred to sk , then the state is said to be
stable1.
3.1.1 Description
Figure 3.1 illustrates how these comparisons work. At the top is the starting state sk for which
stability is being calculated. From sk , DM i has UIs st and su2. Next, the opponent’s moves
(either UMs or UIs depending on the stability concept being applied) from DM i ’s UIs are
calculated, giving sets RN−i (st ) and RN−i (su ), respectively. The states in RN−i (st ) and in RN−i (su )
are then compared to sk ; if at least one state in RN−i (st ) and at least one state in RN−i (su ) is less
preferred to sk , then sk is stable. As shown with the boxes in the figure, the comparison is being
made between sk and RN−i (st ) and between sk and RN−i (su ).
The underlining motive for DMs’ moves in this stability analysis is utility maximization
based on (at most three) moves by DMs. Thus, the idea that a DMmight remain at sk is only
considered when sk is more preferred to any of the states in RN−i (st ) and RN−i (su ). However,
there remains the interesting question of the downstream implications of DM i deciding to
remain at sk – could DM i benefit from staying or could there be sanctions compared to taking
an available UI? This line of inquiry motivates the introduction of new family of stability
1SMR stability allows DM i to move once more before checking for stability.
2There may be more or less than two possible UIs; the number of UIs depicted in the figure is for illustration
purposes only.
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concepts which compares parallel scenarios in which DM i stays at sk to those in which DM i
moves to an available UI.
3.1.2 Example
By way of example, a dispute that occurred between the Ministry of Environment (MoE), the
local government (LG), and Uniroyal Chemical Ltd (UR) in the town of Elmira, Ontario is
considered. This conflict was first introduced in Hipel, Fang et al. 1993 and has been used to
study a variety of GraphModel extensions.
In 1989, theMoE discovered that the town of Elmira’smain source of water, an underground
aquifer, was contaminated with N-nitroso demethylamine (NDMA). It was immediately sus-
pected that UR, which made pesticides and rubber products, was to blame for the presence of
the carcinogen in the aquifer. The MoE issued a Control Order (CO) requiring that UR correct
the situation; however, UR rejected the order and launched an appeal. Local governments
from the Regional Municipality of Waterloo and the Township of Woolwich banded together in
order to safeguard their interests and attempted to pressure UR into accepting the CO. At the
point in time of analysis (1991), UR was appealing the CO and the conflict had stagnated.
Table 3.1 illustrates the DMs, their options, and the feasible states for this conflict derived
in Hipel, Fang et al. 1993. The MoE has the option to modify the CO issued by making it more
favourable to UR. UR can delay the appeal process, accept the CO being offered by the MoE,
or abandon its site in Elmira. Finally, the LG can insist that the original CO be applied. The
possible feasible states that can be formed in this conflict are shown as columns of 1s and 0s in
this table where a "1" means that the option opposite has been selected by the DM controlling
it and a "0" indicates that it was not chosen. The dashes in the last column convey that the
DM’s choice of option is irrelevant; this occurs because UR’s decision to abandon the Elmira
site renders the rest of the DM’s choices moot. For convenience, the states are labelled s1 to s9
in the bottom row of the table. The format used in Table 3.1 is called Option Form and was
originally introduced by Howard (Howard 1971); it is commonly used within the GraphModel
to represent states in a realistic fashion.
Table 3.1: DMs, options, and feasible states for the Elmira conflict
Ministry of Environment (MoE)
Modify CO favourably 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -
Uniroyal (UR)
Delay the appeal 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 -
Accept CO being offered 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 -
Abandon the site 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Local Government (LG)
Insist on original CO 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 -
States s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
Given the feasible states in the conflict, eachDMhas its own ranking of the states depending
on their goals. The MoE would like the aquifer to be cleaned, UR prefers that the CO be
either modified or rescinded, and the LG wants to protects its citizens. The Graph Model
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representation of this conflict is shown in Figure 3.2. The dashed lines represent the moves
available to the MoE; the solid lines correspond to moves available to UR, and the dotted lines
represent themoves available to the LG. The preference rankings for the DMs from the original
analysis, with states listed frommost preferred on the left to least preferred on the right, are
kept.
s1 s2
s5 s6
s3 s4
s7 s8
s9
MoE(dashed lines): s7  s3  s4  s8  s5  s1  s2  s6  s9
UR (solid lines): s1  s4  s8  s5  s9  s2  s3  s7  s6
LG (dotted lines): s7  s3  s5  s1  s8  s6  s4  s2  s9
Figure 3.2: GraphModel of the Elmira conflict
3.2 Initial State Stabilities
The general idea of the comparisons performed in the new solution concepts is illustrated in
Figure 3.3. From some starting state sk , DM i can choose to stay at sk ormove to some available
UI su or st 3. Opponent moves from each of these states (RN−i (sk ), RN−i (su ), and RN−i (st )) are
calculated and states inRN−i (sk ) are compared to states inRN−i (su ) and to states inRN−i (st ). This
comparison is assessing outcomes that might occur if DM i remains at sk to those whichmight
transpire if DM i were to take a UI from state sk . Since the new stability concepts consider
what occurs when DM i remains at some initial state sk , they will be referred to as initial state
stabilities.
The main difference between initial state stabilities and the traditional GraphModel sta-
bilities lies in which sets of counter-moves by opponents are under consideration. Graph
3The number of available UIs shown in this example is for illustration purposes only.
18
3.2. Initial State Stabilities
Model stabilities consider counter-moves from the focal DM’s set of UIs; initial state stabilities
consider counter-moves from the focal DM’s set of UIs and from the initial state sk . Initial state
stabilities thus treat the starting state sk in the same way as GraphModel stabilities treat UIs,
that is, by considering which states the opponents can reach from there.
sk
su ∈
R+i (sk )
sk st ∈
R+i (sk )
RN−i (st )RN−i (su )RN−i (sk )
Figure 3.3: Comparison for new stabilities
The question that now arises is how to compare states in RN−i (sk ) to those in RN−i (su ) and
in RN−i (st ) in a way that provides useful information. To this end, a dichotomous analysis
which reflects a DM’s level of risk-taking is proposed: “optimistic" and “pessimistic" initial
state stabilities. For the present purposes, the terms “optimistic" and “pessimistic" serve as
labels which provide a simple way to refer to a more complex behavioural profile. As such,
they are not meant in the everyday sense of dispositions of behaviour or attitude toward life;
rather they are meant to communicate which type of comparison (best case or worst case, as
will be discussed in upcoming sections) the focal DM is effecting when applying initial state
stabilities. Given that within the initial state stability framework it is necessary to compare
states within sets, transitivity of preferences for each DMmust hold.
Furthermore, similar to the distinction drawn between GMR and SEQ stabilities with
respect to opponent moves, the opponent move sets considered can be sets of UMs or UIs.
This consideration further divides the types of initial state stabilities into a total of four distinct
solution concepts.
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3.2.1 Pessimistic Initial State Stabilities
These solution concepts are meant to capture a risk-averse DM by comparing the worst-case
scenario across outcome sets. In other words, for a starting state sk , the DMwill compare the
least preferred state in the set of opponentmoves from sk to the least preferred states in the sets
of opponent moves from the UIs available from sk . If the least preferred state in sk is equally or
more preferred to the least preferred states in the other sets, then DM i will stay at sk .
Formally, the set of least preferred states is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. The setw (st ) denotes the set of least preferred states for DM i in the set RN−i (st ).
If RN−i (st ) = ∅, thenw (st ) = st .
Definition 3.2. A state sk is pessimistic initial state (PIS) stable for DM i ifw (st ) -i w (sk ) for
all st ∈ R+i (sk ).
This DM is verifying whether the worst-case scenario that could arise from staying at initial
state sk is more or equally preferred to the worst-case scenario arising frommoving away from
sk by following an available UI. If the worst-case scenario at sk is more preferred to all of the
other worst-case scenarios, then DM i stays at the initial state sk .
Analogously, if DM i is aware of their opponents’ preferences, sets of opponent UIs can be
considered:
Definition3.3. The setw+(st )denotes the set of least preferred states forDM i in the setR+N−i (st ).
If R+N−i (st ) = ∅, thenw+(st ) = st .
With this additional definition, we can formally define sequentially pessimistic inital state
stability:
Definition3.4. A state sk is sequentially pessimistic initial state (SPIS) stable forDM i ifw+(st ) -i
w+(sk ) for all st ∈ R+i (sk ).
The Elmira conflict detailed in Section 3.1.2 will be used to illustrate these calculations.
First, consider state s1 for LG. If LG were to remain at state s1, then UR could move to states
s3 and s9, while the MoE can move to state s2. From s2 and s3, the conflict can be moved to
state s4 by the LG andUR, respectively. Hence RUR,MoE (s1) = {s2, s3, s4, s9}. If, on the other hand,
LG were to take its UI to state s5, then UR can move to states s9 and s7, while the MoE can
move to state s6, and UR and MoE can, by moving in sequence, also reach state s8. Hence
RUR,MoE (s5) = {s6, s7, s8, s9}. Among the states in RUR,MoE (s1), LG’s least preferred state is s9, and
s9 is also the least preferred state for LG in RUR,MoE (s5). Sincew (s1)LG = s9 andw (s5)LG = s9, then
LG is better off not moving from state s1, which is PIS stable for LG.
If only opponent UIs are considered, one has R+UR,MoE (s1) = ∅ and R+UR,MoE (s5) = ∅; in other
words, neither opponent has a UI from either state s1 or state s5 and would remain there.
Comparing the two states,w (s5)LG = s5 w (s1)LG = s1, but s5 LG s1, therefore state s1 is not SPIS
stable for LG since they are better off moving to state s5 from state s1 rather than remaining.
On the other hand, state s2 is SPIS stable for LG: R+UR,MoE (s2) = {s4, s9} and R+UR,MoE (s6) =
{s8, s9}. The least preferred state in the first set is s4, and the least preferred state in the second
set is s9. Sincew+(s2)LG = s4,w+(s6)LG = s9, and s4 LG s9, LG would do better by remaining at
state s2, hence s2 is SPIS stable for LG.
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3.2.2 Optimistic Initial State Stabilities
In contrast to PIS and SPIS, DM i could, rather than comparing worst-case outcomes, compare
best-case outcomes. This DM is more risk-seeking than its pessimistic counterpart; what
matters is not the worst-case, but what might happen in the best-case scenario.
Analogously to the sets w (st ) and w+(st ), we can also define the sets of most preferred
outcomes as follows:
Definition 3.5. The set b(st ) denotes the set of most preferred states for DM i in the set RN−i (st ).
If RN−i (st ) = ∅, then b(st ) = st
Definition3.6. The setb+(st )denotes the set ofmost preferred states forDM i in the setR+N−i (st ).
If R+N−i (st ) = ∅, then b+(st ) = st
It is now possible to define initial state stabilities in the optimistic case:
Definition 3.7. A state sk is optimistic initial state (OIS) stable for DM i if b(st ) -i b(sk ) for all
st ∈ R+i (sk ).
In words, DM i is verifying whether the best possible outcome in RN−i (sk ) is better or equal
to the best possible outcomes in RN−i (st ) for all UIs st from sk . If this is the case, then DM i will
remain at sk with the hope that the conflict will move to the best possible state.
The analogue definition with opponent UIs instead of opponent UMs is:
Definition3.8. Astate sk is sequentially optimistic initial state (SOIS) stable forDM i ifb+(st ) -i b+(sk )
for all st ∈ R+i (sk ).
Once again referring to the Elmira conflict as an example, consider state s3 for UR, who has
the option to stay or move to state s9. To check OIS stability, one finds RLG,MoE (s3) = {s7, s4}
and RLG,MoE (s9) = {s9}. The most preferred state in the first set is state s9, which is also trivially
the most preferred state in the second set. Since b(s3)UR = s4 and b(s9)UR = s9, state s3 is
OIS stable for UR. Checking the same state for SOIS stability, one has R+LG,MoE (s3) = {s7} and
R+LG,MoE (s9) = {s9}. Since b+(s3) = s7 UR s9 = b+(s9), state s3 is not SOIS stable for UR.
State s3 is, however, SOIS stable for LG: R+UR,MoE (s3) = {s9} and R+LG,MoE (s7) = {s9}. Since
b+(s3)LG = s9 and b+(s7)LG = s9, state s3 is SOIS stable for LG.
Table 3.2 summarizes the new solution concepts and describes some of their important
characteristics. PIS and SPIS are more conservative solution concepts since they are motivated
by a desire to mitigate the worst-case scenarios; OIS and SOIS, on the other hand, are more
risk seeking as they seek to maximise the best-case secnarios.
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Table 3.2: Initial state solution concepts
Solution
Concept
Description Foresight Know-ledge
of Prefer-
ences
Risk
PIS Worst case resulting from
staying is better than worst
case resulting from oppon-
ent UM responses to all UIs
Medium Own Conservative
SPIS Worst case resulting from
staying is better than worst
case resulting from oppon-
ent UI responses to all UIs
Medium All Conservative
OIS Best case resulting from
staying is better than best
case resulting from oppon-
ent UM responses to all UIs
Medium Own Some risk
SOIS Best case resulting from
staying is better than best
case resulting from oppon-
ent UI responses to all UIs
Medium All Some risk
3.3 Relationships Among Stability Concepts
There exist some relationships among thedifferent initial state stabilities defined in theprevious
sections. These relationships are described and formalized in the following propositions.
Proposition 3.1. PIS stability is equivalent to OIS stability if |RN−i (sk )| = |RN−i (st )| = 1 for all
t ∈ R+i (sk ).
Proof. Suppose that |RN−i (sk )| = |RN−i (st )| = 1 for all t ∈ R+i (sk ). This means that there is only
one state in each of the sets of counter-moves by opponents from sk and from st ∀st ∈ R+i (sk ).
In other words, whatever state sx is in RN−i (sk ), it is by default both themost and least preferred
state in that set: w (sk ) = b(sk ) = sx . This is also true for the state sy ∈ RN−i (st ), i.e., w (st ) =
b(st ) = sy for all st ∈ R+i (sk ). Sincew (sk ) (=b(sk )) is compared tow (st ) (=b(st )) for all t ∈ R+i (sk ),
calculating PIS stability for sk is identical to calculating OIS stability for that state. 
Proposition 3.2. SPIS stability is equivalent to SOIS stability if |R+N−i (sk )| = |R+N−i (st )| = 1 for all
t ∈ R+i (sk ).
Proof. The proof identical to that of Proposition 3.1 shown above except that the sets RN−i (su )
are replaced by the sets R+N−i (su ) for u = k, t . 
Proposition 3.3. PIS stability is equivalent to SPIS stability if RN−i (sk ) = R+N−i (sk ) and RN−i (st ) =
R+N−i (st ) for all t ∈ R+i (sk ).
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Proof. Suppose that RN−i (sk ) = R+N−i (sk ) and RN−i (st ) = R+N−i (st ) for all t ∈ R+i (sk ). This means
that from state sk , all opponentmoves happen to beUIs and that the same occurs for state st for
all t ∈ R+i (sk ). Since RN−i (sk ) = R+N−i (sk ), this means thatw (sk ) = w+(sk ); since RN−i (st ) = R+N−i (st )
for all t ∈ R+i (sk ), this means thatw (st ) = w+(st ) ∀st ∈ R+i (sk ). Therefore, verifying PIS stability,
which compares w (sk ) to w (st ) ∀st ∈ R+i (sk ) is equivalent to SPIS stability, which compares
w+(sk ) tow+(st )∀st ∈ R+i (sk ). 
Proposition 3.4. OIS stability is equivalent to SOIS stability ifRN−i (sk ) = R+N−i (sk ) andRN−i (st ) =
R+N−i (st ) for all t ∈ R+i (sk ).
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Proposition 3.3 except that the setsw (su ) andw+(su ) are
replaced with the sets b(su ) and b+(su ) for u = t , k . 
As shown in Propositions 3.1 to 3.4, there are special cases in which the new stability
concepts can be reduced to one another. PIS (SPIS) is equivalent to OIS (SOIS) if there is only
one state in each of the sets of opponent counter-moves; by default those states will be both the
least and most preferred states in the set. PIS (OIS) is equivalent to SPIS (SOIS) if all opponent
moves happen to be UIs. These results are useful for calculations since these can, in some
cases, be greatly simplified.
Proposition 3.5. If a state sk ∈ S is Nash stable for DM i , then it is also
(a) PIS;
(b) SPIS;
(c) OIS; and
(d) SOIS stable for DM i .
Proof. (a) : Suppose that sk is Nash stable for DM i , then R+i (sk ) = ∅. This means that the
opponent sets RN−i (st ) are also empty, since there is no st ∈ R+i (sk ). The condition thatw (st ) -i
w (sk ) for all st ∈ R+i (sk ) is thus trivially satisfied.
(b) - (d): The remaining proofs are analogous to the one shown above. The key point is that a
Nash stable state has no UIs and that this trivially satisfies the definitions of SPIS, OIS, and
SOIS stabilities. 
Proposition 3.6. If opponents have no UMs from sk and RN−i (st ) , ∅ for all st ∈ R+i (sk ), then
PIS stability is equivalent to GMR stability.
Proof. The calculation of PIS stability comparesw (sk ) tow (st ) for all st ∈ R+i (sk ). If opponents
have no UMs from sk , the comparison will simply be betweenw (sk ) = sk andw (st ) ∀st ∈ R+i (sk ).
That is, the initial state sk is compared to states in RN−i (st ) for st ∈ R+i (sk ).
Note that this comparison is identical to that being performed in GMR calculations: state sk
is GMR stable if for every st ∈ R+i (sk ), there is at least one state in RN−i (st )which is less preferred
to sk . That is, at least one state in RN−i (st ) is less preferred to sk for every st ∈ R+i (sk ).
Having established that PIS and GMR stabilities compare the same sets, it remains to
show that the comparisons will yield the same stability outcomes. State sk is PIS stable if
w (st ) -i w (sk ) = sk ∀st ∈ R+i (sk ). Another way to express this is that sk is less preferred to at
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least one state (call itw (st )) for each of the sets RN−i (st ); this is precisely the definition of GMR
stability. 
Proposition 3.7. If opponents have no UIs from sk and RN−i (st ) , ∅ for all st ∈ R+i (sk ) then SPIS
stability is equivalent to SEQ stability.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.6 with RN−i (st ) replaced with R+N−i (st )
andw (su ) replaced withw+(su ) for u = t , k . 
Propositions 3.5 to 3.7 relate the new solution concepts to the core GraphModel stability
concepts. These results are useful for calculating initial state stabilities: for example, if that
a state is Nash stable, one immediately knows that it is also PIS, SPIS, OIS, and SOIS stable.
Furthermore, under the conditions specified in Propositions 3.6 and 3.7, it is possible to reduce
PIS and SPIS calculation to GMR and SEQ calculations, respectively.
3.4 Application: Elmira conflict
In this section, the complete stability results for the conflict described in Section 3.1.2 are
detailed. Both initial state and standard GraphModel stabilities are calculated and discussed.
3.4.1 Initial State Stabilities
The calculations for rest of the Elmira conflict are carried out in a manner similar to the one
detailed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Table 3.3 summarizes the equilibrium results by type of
equilibrium. The detailed calculation results are shown in Table 3.4 which is included at the
end of this section for reference.
Table 3.3: Initial state stability equilibria for the Elmira conflict
Type of equilibrium States
PIS s1, s4, s5, s8, s9
SPIS s3, s5, s8, s9
OIS s4, s5, s7, s8, s9
SOIS s5, s8, s9
Given the DMs’ individual stability results, there are PIS equilibria at states s1 (UR delays
the appeal), s4 (MoE modifies the CO and UR accepts it), s5 (UR appeals and LG insists), s8
(MoEmodifies the CO, UR accepts it, and LG insist), and s9 (UR abandons the site). In other
words, if all three DMs were risk-averse and concerned about opponent sanctioning, one of
these states would be expected to be the outcome of the conflict.
If the DMs were risk-averse and also aware of each others’ preferences, then states s3 (UR
accepts CO), s5, s8, and s9 are SPIS equilibria. Note that states s5, s8 and s9 are both PIS and
SPIS equilibria; this means that the DMs’ knowledge of their opponent’s preferences does not
affect the stability of these states. The opposite is true for states s1, s4, and s3: states s1 and s4
are equilibria only under the assumption that the possibility of opponent sanctioning by UMs
is allowed, while s3 is an equilibrium only when opponent UIs are considered.
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Looking at the OIS equilibria, these occur at states s4, s5, s7 (LG insists and UR accepts CO),
s8 and s9. If all three DMs were risk-taking and concerned about opponent UM sanctioning,
those states represent possible resolutions of the conflict.
The SOIS equilibria for this conflict occur at states s5, s8, and s9. Note that each of these
states is included in the list of OIS equilibria; for these states, assumptions regarding knowledge
of opponent preferences do not affect the stability of the states. It thus remains that states s4
and s7 are affected by whether opponent preferences are known.
Now, comparing PIS and OIS equilibria, note that states s4, s5, s8, and s9 appear in both
lists. This indicates that the level of optimism/pessimism for the DMs does not affect these
states as they are equilibria either way. State s1 is exclusively a PIS equilibrium, while state s7 is
purely an OIS equilibrium; the likelihood of these states being the resolution of the conflict
thus depends on the likelihood that each of the DMs follows either PIS or OIS reasoning.
A similar comparison of SPIS and SOIS equilibria shows that they have states s5, s8, and s9
in common. Once again, this shows that the DMs’ behaviour is not affected by whether they
are optimistic or pessimistic. State s3 is exclusively a SPIS equilibrium: for it to be the outcome
of the conflict, all DMsmust follow SPIS reasoning.
Remark that states s5, s8, and s9 are equilibria under all initial state stability concepts. This
is not particularly surprising for state s9 since a move to this state is irreversible. For s5 and s8,
however, this is important to note since it is thought that states which are equilibria under a
range of solution concepts are more likely to occur in practice (Kilgour, Hipel, Fang and Peng
2001; Kilgour and Eden 2010). The initial state stability analysis thus points to these states as
the most likely outcomes. States s4 (PIS and OIS equilibrium), s1 (PIS equilibrium), s3 (SPIS
equilibrium), and s7 (OIS equilibrium) are also possiblities.
It may also be useful to examine the results from each individual DM’s point of view. If each
DM’s two most and two least preferred states are examined, it is interesting to see what kind of
advice each type of initial state stability provides them with. The MoE’s two most preferred
states are s7 and s3, while their two least preferred states are s9, and s6. In all cases, these states
are PIS, SPIS, OIS, and SOIS stable; this means that the MoE should remain at these states
when they occur, regardless of their own level of risk taking.
UR’s two most preferred states, s1 and s4 are also stable under all initial state stabilities,
meaning that UR should remain at these states if they should occur. As for UR’s two least
preferred states s7 and s6, state s6 is not stable under any initial state stability concept, meaning
that UR should move away from s6 regardless of its level of risk aversion. State s7, however
is stable under OIS; this means that UR should stay at state s7 only if their decision-making
follows OIS.
Finally, the stability results show that LG’s most preferred state s7 is stable under all initial
state stability concepts; however, state s3, its second most preferred state, is OIS unstable. This
means that if LG is optimistic and not concerned about opponent sanctioning, it should move
from s3. LG’s least preferred state, s9 is stable under all initial state stability concepts; however,
its second least preferred state s2 is only PIS and SPIS stable. This means that if LG is risk taking,
it should move away from s2.
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Table 3.4: Initial state stabilities for the Elmira conflict
PIS SPIS OIS SOIS
MoE UR LG MoE UR LG MoE UR LG MoE UR LG
s1 X X X X X x X X x X X x
s2 X x X X x X X x x X x x
s3 X x X X X X X x x X x X
s4 X X X X X x X X X X X x
s5 X X X X X X X X X X X X
s6 X x X X x X X x X X x X
s7 X x X X x X X X X X x X
s8 X X X X X X X X X X X X
s9 X X X X X X X X X X X X
A checkmark (X) indicates that the given state is stable under the specified solution concept, while an
"x" means that the state is not stable for that solution concept.
3.4.2 Comparison to GraphModel Stabilities
The complete stability results of the GraphModel for the Elmira conflict are shown in Table 3.5.
As can be seen, states s5, s8, and s9 are Nash equilibria, states s5, s8, and s9 are SEQ equilibria,
states s1, s4, s5, s8, and s9 are GMR equilibria, and states s1, s4, s5, s8, and s9 are SMR equilibria.
Table 3.5: GraphModel stabilities for the Elmira conflict
Nash SEQ GMR SMR
MoE UR LG MoE UR LG MoE UR LG MoE UR LG
s1 X X x X X x X X X X X X
s2 X x x X x X X x X X x X
s3 X x x X x X X x X X x X
s4 X X x X X x X X X X X X
s5 X X X X X X X X X X X X
s6 X x X X x X X x X X x X
s7 X x X X x X X x X X x X
s8 X X X X X X X X X X X X
s9 X X X X X X X X X X X X
By comparing the initial state stability results with those from the GraphModel, one can
see that, in addition to being PIS, SPIS, OIS, and SOIS equilibria, states s5, s8, and s9 are also
Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilibria. This furthers the intuition that one of these states is
likely to be the resolution of the conflict. In fact, the conflict historically ended in state s8 where
a favourably modified CO was negotiated by the MoE and UR.
It should also be noted that using the initial state stability framework revealed equilibria
that were not predicted by any of the GraphModel solution concepts, namely state s3 (SPIS
equilibrium) and state s7 (OIS equilibrium). This type of information is useful to analysts since
it avoids potential surprises that stem from only considering standard GraphModel solution
concepts. Armed with this knowledge, analysts can determine whether state s3 or s7 is likely to
occur given what is known about the DMs.
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The example thus shows that new equilibria can be discovered by using initial state sta-
bility solution concepts. It is well known that analysing a conflict using a range of solution
concepts allows one to better identify likely outcomes (Madani 2013). Initial state stabilities
thus contribute to analysts’ behavioural insights in determining possible conflict resolutions.
3.5 Chapter Summary
A new family of stability concepts, initial state stabilities, is introduced to complement existing
Graph Model stability concepts. This addresses the first of the two motivating questions
discussed in the introduction: "What are other ways to define stability for a state?". The new
stability is defined by introducing a broader state comparison technique: comparisons are
executed between the possible consequences of leaving a given starting state and of staying at
that state. Pessimistic initial state stabilities compare worst case scenarios; a state is stable if
the worst case scenario that it generates is more preferred than the worst case scenarios that
occur at each of that DM’s UIs. Optimistic initial state stabilites, on the other hand, compare
best case scenarios: a state is stable if the best case scenario that could result from it is more
preferred to the best case scenarios which could occur at each of the DM’s UIs. For both types
of solution concepts, opponent UMs (PIS, OIS) and UIs (SPIS and SOIS) are considered, giving
a total of four new solution concepts.
The definition of these new and useful solution concept contributes to both the literature
and, more broadly, to decision-makers’ tool-kits. Building upon solution concepts based on
the GraphModel strengthens the analysis and insights garnered from this framework; these
can then be passed on to decision-makers. Furthermore, the practice of analysing conflicts
using a range of solution concepts can result in a better understanding of the conflict and of
its possible resolutions.
By using initial state stability to analyse a dispute, DMs can determine whether staying at
their most preferred state could result in a worse outcome in the future or whether moving
away from their least preferred state could yield a better outcome in the future. These new
insights allow DMs to answer more than the usual question of "Should I stay because moving
might be risky?"; they can now ask themselves questions such as "If I stay,might I be sanctioned
for it later on?" and "If I go, might I end up in a better state later on?". These questions provide
DMs with new avenues to explore and to analyse when thinking strategically.
As demonstrated by the Elmira conflict case study, using initial state stabilities to analyse
a real-world dispute is fairly straightforward and, for small conflicts, can be done by hand.
Having the conflict represented in Option Form and in GraphModel form greatly facilitates
these calculations. The results gained from the analysis are useful to DMs and analysts: gaining
additional stability information about an individual state is crucial to providing improved
strategic insights about the possible evolution of the conflict.
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Inverse Engineering
This chapter focuses on the secondmotivating question posed in Chapter 1, in which know-
ledge of a DM’s preferences is not assumed. This assumption is quite reasonable: researchers
who work with the GraphModel know that preferences are notoriously difficult to obtain. The
discovery of each DM’s preferences is important for analysing both historical and ongoing
conflicts as the analytical results depend on their accuracy. For ongoing conflicts, a DMmay
not be willing to share their preferences with an analyst and will be much less willing to do so
with an opponent; the study of historical conflicts, on the other hand, may be hampered by a
lack of information or reliable sources. There is also the possibility that a DMmay be uncertain
about their own preferences, taking actions but perhaps not clearly understanding why.
Preference information is crucial toDMs and analystswhowish to garner useful and inform-
ative insights about a conflict. Although preferences can be difficult to ascertain, opponent
moves are clear and observable. Sincemoves are informed by a DM’s preferences, the transpar-
ency of an opponent’s moves can be leveraged by a DM to infer that opponent’s preferences. In
this chapter, methods for ascertaining DMpreferences using observed behaviour are proposed
based ondifferentDMprofiles. Themethods narrowdown the set of aDM’s possible preference
rankings using the information provided by that DM’s actions. The results obtained from these
techniques are to produce more accurate insights when using the GraphModel. Furthermore,
a clear read on opponent preferences allows for improved decision-making; one will have a
better idea of how to arrive at a more preferable result either by changing their opponents’
preferences or by moving strategically.
Adopting an inverse approach for preference elicitation within the GraphModel is a new
endeavour. Such a procedure has several advantages: first, there is little to no need for direct
consultation between DMs and analysts since a DM’s preferences can be inferred from their
behaviour alone. This is particularly relevant for adversarial situations in which DMsmay not
wish to communicate their preferences to analysts in order to preserve a strategic advantage.
This characteristic is also helpful in the study of historical conflicts for which documentation
might be sparse. Rather than relying on an analyst’s best guess or on an approximation of DM
preferences, empirical data are used to generate insights.
Second, the dynamic nature of the algorithms allows for ongoing analysis which adapts to
the latest changes in the conflict. This contrasts with the static approaches characteristic of
the GraphModel which typically select a single point in time to analyse.
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Third and most important, the inverse approach can be used to provide relevant advice to
DMs about what to do next. TheADVICE functionwhich is the focus of Section 4.5 is designed to
provide key information such as expected value and probability of occurrence. The overarching
goal is to assist with real-time decision-making: advice is updated as the conflict progresses,
andDMs canuse the information provided by opponentmoves to determine their best counter-
moves and strategies. The goal is not to replace a DM in the decision-making process, but to
supply enriching information for reaching more informed decisions.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 discusses the philosophical implications
of relating preferences and options; Section 4.2 provides an overview of the literature and
work done on preference elicitation; Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 detail the methodology and its
associated algorithms; and Section 4.6 details a simple case study.
4.1 Philosophical Interlude
In this section, the fundamentals of Revealed Preference Theory are discussed and then cri-
tiqued. In particular, the classical economics view of preferences is contrasted with the per-
spective provided by psychology and behavioural economics. While the former strongly in-
forms the methodology introduced in the upcoming sections, the latter offer valid criticisms
which deserve to be presented. The synthesis section provides a way forward which acknow-
ledges both the benefits and shortcomings of the economics approach to preferences.
4.1.1 Revealed Preference Theory
From a classical economics standpoint, mental preferences describe the attitude of a DM
toward a set of objects. A DM’s choices always maximise the utility of their behavioural prefer-
ence relation i.e., the preference relation which is observable to the analyst. A DM’s actions
manifest their behavioural preferences, which are assumed to be identical to their mental
preferences.
The latter statement is the cornerstone of the standard economic or neo-classical economic
approach in which mental preferences and behavioural preferences are in perfect correspond-
ence. This Principle of Revealed Preference was originally devised to infer consumer behaviour
based on their choice of goods and posits that observed behaviour can reveal a DM’s mental
preferences (Samuelson 1938; Samuelson 1948).
A corollary of the Principle is the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference which ensures that a
DM is consistent in their preferences: if a DM chooses option A over option B , they must not
then choose option B over option A since their first choice revealed a preference for option A
over option B . In this view, actions are dictated by preferences; DMsmake choices according
to whether or not they maximise the utility of their mental preferences.
Although Revealed Preference Theory has been further developed and enriched since
Samuelson’s day (see Hands 2013 for a history and overview), the Principle of Revealed Prefer-
ences is what underlies the methodology and algorithms presented in the upcoming sections;
for conciseness, additional details and subtleties of Revealed Preference Theory will not be
discussed here. The key assumptions to keep in mind are (1) DMs are rational (i.e., are utility
maximisers) and (2) mental preferences are identical to behavioural preferences.
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In the context of the Graph Model, DMs are choosing their actions among their set of
options (not among a bundle of goods as in Samuelson’s original formulation). Preferences
are understood as rankings of a set of outcomes for a given conflict: each DM has their own
individual set of mental preferences which describe their attitude toward the set of states.
During a conflict, DMsmust make choices about which of their options to take (or not). The
choices made by DMs (i.e., their behavioural preferences) can directly reveal their mental
preferences.
4.1.2 Critiques of Revealed Preference Theory
Research in psychology and in behavioural economics has demonstrated that the relationship
betweenactions andpreferences is not as straightforward as classical economists claim. Several
empirical studies have demonstrated an inverse causality to the one outlined in the previous
section: actions can, in fact, affect preferences (see, for example: Festinger and Carlsmith 1959,
Ariely and Norton 2008, Sharot, Martino and Dolan 2009, and Egan, Bloom and Santos 1959).
From the economics side, Revealed Preference Theory has been criticised by, amongst
others, Sen andHausman (Sen 1973; Sen 1993; Hausman 2000). One of the arguments that they
formulate against Revealed Preference Theory is that choice alone is not sufficient to reveal
preferences. Sen’s argument centres around the violation of the axioms of revealed preference
that occur when contexts change. Sen terms these changes of context menu dependence (Sen
1993). Since the DM’s choices often depend on the context, argues Sen, they alone cannot
determine that DM’s preferences.
Hausman’s critique follows a similar line: a DM’s choice is not enough to reveal their
preference as there may be other influencing factors in play. For instance, the DMmaymake
mistakes, may have an incomplete ranking (i.e., some elements may not be comparable to one
another), or may have moral considerations to take into account (Hausman 2000).
To summarize the important criticisms highlighted here, first we note that the relationship
between actions and preferences is not unidirectional, but can often form a closed feedback
loop; and second, a DM’s choice may not be sufficient to reveal their preference due to context
or other mitigating factors – in other words, DMsmay behave in ways inconsistent with pure
utility maximisation.
4.1.3 Synthesis
Recall the two assumptions highlighted in Section 4.1.1: (1) DMs are rational (i.e., are utility
maximisers) and (2) mental preferences are identical to behavioural preferences. In light of
the criticisms discussed in Section 4.1.2 both of these must be carefully re-examined.
The first assumption regarding utility maximisation requires relaxing; as Sen and Haus-
man correctly point out, DMsmay take actions on the basis of some other heuristic. This is
also highlighted in Rubinstein and Salant’s appraisal of Revealed Preference Theory which
argues that the theory is useful insofar as it helps to classify decision models which incorpor-
ate additional psychological factors (Rubinstein and Salant 2008). Fortunately, a variety of
heuristics is incorporated into the newmethodology, which introduces behavioural profiles
(see section 4.4) such as GMR and SMR which do not always assume that the DM chooses the
state which maximizes their payoff. As will be shown, these alternative profiles allow a DM
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to choose actions based on anticipated opponent counter-moves and sanctions rather than
on the basis of simple payoff comparison. Furthermore, the incorporation of further decision
heuristics remains an active part of this research.
What psychology and behavioural economics reveal about the relationship between prefer-
ences and actions, namely that they have the potential to be mutually influencing, can make it
tempting to discard any results obtained with assumption (2) in mind. However, as Spiegler
argues, Revealed Preference Theory is a usefulmodel development tool: "Even if one rejects the
revealed preference principle as a criterion for determining the admissibility of “behavioral”
decision models, the principle still has a heuristic value in the development of suchmodels.
A rudimentary revealed-preference exercise helps clarifying general aspects of the behavior
induced by the model. The clarifcation obtained in this way is so basic, that it cannot be left
for a future decision theorist. Instead, it should be part of the behavioral theorist’s bag of
tools" (Spiegler 2008). Thus, taking the results obtained from a Revealed Preference Theory
with a grain of salt while keeping present their heuristic value offers a way forward.
The goal of this section is to better situate the methodology which will be introduced
later in this chapter both in the context of Revealed Preference Theory and of its associated
criticisms. As discussed, the methodology allows for DM behaviour that falls outside of the
traditional utility maximisation heuristic by introducing behavioural profiles such as GMR and
SMR. Furthermore, although the relationship between actions and preferences is indeed more
complex than this method assumes, it nevertheless provides a benchmark for analysis and can
be one of the many tools used by analysts to gain a better understanding of the conflict.
4.2 Review of the Literature
Preference elicitation, that is, determining aDM’s preferences over a list of objects or outcomes,
is a key step in constructing decision-making and game-theoretic models. As a result, both
"forward" and "inverse" approaches have been developed to assist analysts and DMs with this
important task. Generally speaking, the former attempt to construct preference rankings based
on attributes, values, or judgments provided by the DM; commonmethods in this vein include
the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) (R. W. Saaty 1987; T. L. Saaty 1980), ELimination and
Choice Expressing the REality (ELECTRE) (Figueira et al. 2013; Roy 1968) and value-focused
thinking (Keeney 1992).
Inverse approaches, on the other hand, work "backwards" from observed behaviours to a
reward function which contains preference information. These approaches commonly use
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) or Partially Observable MDPs (POMDPs) to infer a DM’s
reward function given an observed behaviour (Abbeel and Ng 2004; Ng and Russell 2000;
Boutilier 2002). Such techniques are designed to solve problems in inverse reinforcement
learning: one can only observe behaviours from an expert and must use these observations to
learn to perform these same tasks.
Preference elicitation is a critical step in the GraphModel methodology; the model relies
on preference input from all of the DMs in order to produce its analysis results. Within the
GraphModel paradigm, "forward" preference elicitation is akin to eliciting ordinal preferences
from DMs. Several techniques can be used to perform this task, including option weighting,
option prioritizing, and direct ranking (Fang et al. 2003b). More recently, work has been done
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to integrate AHP within the GraphModel (Ke, Li and Hipel 2007; Ke, Li and Hipel 2012; Ke, Fu
et al. 2012) and to extend option prioritization to non-standard preference structures (Bashar,
Kilgour and Hipel 2014). In this case, the analyst is working closely with all of the DMs involved
in the conflict and, in doing so, is able to elicit the necessary preference information to carry
out a stability analysis.
Many techniques have examined preferences and their role in the Graph Model. One
family of procedures consists of exploring non-standard preference relations in order to cap-
ture a DM’s uncertainty over the set of states. Such apporaches include unknown prefer-
ences (Li, Hipel et al. 2004; Xu, Hipel, Kilgour and Chen 2010), fuzzy preferences (Bashar, Hipel
and Kilgour 2012), probabilistic preferences (Rego and dos Santos 2015), grey-based prefer-
ences (Kuang et al. 2015), strength of preferences (Hamouda, Kilgour andHipel 2004; Hamouda,
Kilgour and Hipel 2006; Xu, Hipel and Kilgour 2009b), and information-gapmodels (Ben-Haim
and Hipel 2002).
The first four of these approaches examine different preference relations and structures in
order to deal with the uncertainty that a particular DM has over the set of states. Strength of
preferences considers "strongly preferred" relations between states in addition to the usual
"preferred" and "indifferent" relations (Hamouda, Kilgour and Hipel 2004; Hamouda, Kilgour
and Hipel 2006); this concept was later generalized to any level of preference (Xu, Hipel and
Kilgour 2009b) and incorporated into coalition analysis (Li, Inohara and Xu 2014).
Unknown preferences make use of an additional "unknown" relation between possible
states. Unknown preferences and strength of preference are also combined to produce a hybrid
preference structure (Xu, Hipel, Kilgour and Chen 2010). Fuzzy preferences make use of fuzzy
sets, which specify a degree of belonging of an element to a set, to define fuzzy relations and
fuzzy preferences (Bashar, Hipel and Kilgour 2012). In the probabilistic Graph Model, it is
assumed that DMs have probabilistic preferences over the set of states, whereby one state
is preferred over another with a certain probability (Rego and dos Santos 2015). Grey-based
preferences use grey numbers, which are real numbers that may be members of a discrete set
of real numbers, or may fall within one or several intervals (Kuang et al. 2015). In all cases, the
new preferences structures are used to construct their respective analogues of GraphModel
solution concepts and equilibria. The common assumption underlying most of these methods
is that the DMs are uncertain of their or their opponents’ ranking of states; some states may be
strictly preferred over others, but some ambiguity may exist. In other words, the uncertainty
may be present within each DM’s own preference ranking.
Another family of approaches attempts to bypass preferences entirely. Incomplete informa-
tion in the Graph Model is examined by Sakakibara et al (Sakakibara, Okada and Nakase 2002).
This approach specifies the minimum information needed for analysts or third parties to
perform stability analyses. The robustness analysis developed in this work is general enough to
be applied to conflicts in which DM preferences are not fully known. This work’s primary goal
is not to discover DMpreferences, but to allow for stability analysis of conflicts with incomplete
information.
Yet a different method, the inverse Graph Model, deals with the problem of preference
elicitation by identifying preference rankings that could lead to a desired resolution(Kinsara,
Kilgour and Hipel 2014; Kinsara, Petersons et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2018). Rather than working
forward from DMs, options, and preferences to conflict resolutions, this approach begins
by selecting a desired resolution and determining which preferences are required to bring it
32
4.3. Details on Preference Rankings
about. Analysts use what information they have about the DMs’ preferences and then apply
the inverse approach to determine what other preference rankings are necessary for creating
the desired resolution. Rather than attempting to ascertain opponent preferences based on
actions, this methodology bypasses the problem entirely.
The philosophy guiding the present research falls somewhere in between the two families
of approaches; no new preference structures are used, nor is the existing preference structure
modified, yet the determination of preferences is not bypassed – it is the central concern.
The key question is how to use observable behaviours to infer preferences, and how to use
that information to the benefit of DMs. In order to answer this question, a simple preference
structure is assumed and coupled with the knowledge gained from observing actions.
Adopting an inverse approach for preference elicitation in the GraphModel is a new en-
deavour (Garcia and Hipel 2017; Garcia, Obeidi and Hipel 2018). This procedure has several
advantages: first, there is a lesser need for direct consultation between DMs and analysts
since a DM’s preferences and some useful accompanying information can be inferred from
behaviour alone. This is particularly relevant for situations in which DMs wishing to preserve
a strategic advantage may not wish to communicate their preferences to analysts. This is also
helpful in the study of historical conflicts for which documentation might be sparse. Rather
than relying on an analyst’s best guess or on an approximation of DM preferences, empirical
data are used to generate insights.
Second, the dynamic nature of the algorithms allows for ongoing analysis which adapts
to the latest changes in the conflict. This contrasts with the static approaches of the Graph
Model which typically selects a single point in time for analysis. Finally, the inverse approach
can be used to provide relevant advice to DMs about what to do next. The ADVICE function
which is the focus of Section 4.5 is designed to provide key information and is updated as the
conflict progresses. DMs can use the information provided by observable moves to determ-
ine their best counter-moves and strategies in real time. The goal is not to replace a DM in
the decision-making process, but rather to supply enriching information for reaching more
informed decisions.
4.3 Details on Preference Rankings
The first part of this section emphasizes preference rankings, which are fundamental to the
algorithms developed in the latter part. Then, once the problem is discussed in general terms,
algorithms specific to each of three GraphModel stability concept are developed, consisting of
Nash (Section 4.4.2), GMR (Section 4.4.3), and SMR (Section 4.4.5) stability.
Given the importance of preference rankings to the approach, it is valuable to delve into
them a bit deeper. Preference rankings are weak orderings of the set of states, with states being
equally preferred (∼) or more preferred () to one another. For example, a DMmight have the
following preference ranking over a set of four states: s1  s2 ∼ s3  s4. This means that state s1
is preferred to state s2, which is equally preferred to state s3 andmore preferred to state s4.
Other jargon is employed to label preference rankings in the game theory and decision-
making literature. For instance, ordinal preference refers to a weak ordering of states in which
states are ordered or ranked frommost to least preferred inwhich ties are allowed. Strict ordinal
preference indicates an ordering of stateswhich are ranked frommost to least preferredwithout
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any ties being present. Both ordinal (weak ordering) and strict ordinal (ordering) of states
satisfy the property of transitivity: s1 - s2 and s2 - s3 implies s1 - s3 for all s1, s2, s3 ∈ S .
Preference rankings over the set of states can bemapped to payoff values: aDM’s preference
ranking can be recovered by comparing the payoff values of states and ordering them from
highest payoff (i.e., most preferred) to lowest payoff (i.e., least preferred). The payoff that DM i
receives from some state s ∈ S is denoted by pii (s ). Payoffs can, in theory, be any real number as
long as the ranking is respected. To illustrate, for DM A, a valid payoff function for preference
ranking pA = s1  s2 ∼ s3  s4 is piA(s1) = 4, piA(s2) = piA(s3) = 2.5, and piA(s4) = 0. A non-valid
payoff function is piA(s1) = 4, piA(s2) = 3, piA(s3) = 2, and piA(s4) = 2.5 because piA(s2) and piA(s3)
must be equal and since piA(s3)must be greater than piA(s4).
It is important to remember that preference rankings donot specify the degree of preference,
only the preference order – it is not known howmuchmore one state is preferred to another.
Given this observation, the choice of payoff values is somewhat arbitrary. For the present
purposes, an additional requirement is imposed: any payoff function taking values of k0 <
k1 < k2 < . . . < ks  for  > 0 will do as long as there is equal distance between each
payoff value, i.e., |ki − ki+1 | = |ki−1 − ki | ∀i . For simplicity, payoffs are set using  = 1 and
|ki − ki+1 | = |ki−1 − ki | = 1. For example, the payoffs for DM A in the ranking given above
are: piA(s1) = 4, piA(s3) = piA(s2) = 3, and piA(s1) = 2. Given this convention, states in the same
equivalence class will receive the same payoff and the payoff of any given state is the total
number of states minus that state’s equivalence class index which is counted starting from the
closest equivalence classes to the most preferred state.
Since valid preference rankings are weak orderings over the set of possible states, the total
number of preference rankings is given by the number of partitions of the set of states into
different equivalence classes (delimited by ∼) multiplied by the number of ways to order the
elements within them. The total number of preference rankings ofm states, allowing equalities,
is given by the ordered Bell number (Good 1975):
Bell (m) =
s∑
k=0
k !
{
m
k
}
, (4.1)
where
{m
k
}
is the Stirling number of the second kind which calculates the number of ways to
partition a set ofm objects into k non-empty subsets:{
m
k
}
=
1
k !
k∑
j=0
(−1)k−j
(
k
j
)
jm . (4.2)
Thus, given the number of states in the conflict under study, it is possible to generate the
list of all possible preference rankings. Although the list is initially quite large, observing a DM’s
moves allows rankings to be eliminated, shortenting the list of possible preference rankings.
Each observed action has the potential to provide additional information about that DM’s
preference ranking.
The algorithms proceed by narrowing the set of feasible preference rankings at each it-
eration. The set P(k )i contains all possible preference rankings overm states for DM i after k
iterations of the algorithm. If all preference rankings are assumed to be feasible at the start of
the game, then P(0)i = P(0) ∀i , where P(0) is the set of all possible preference rankings over the
set of states. As the conflict progresses, the cardinality of P(k )i decreases.
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4.4 Behavioural Profiles
Let pi denote DM i ’s preference ranking over the set of states and g i denote i ’s action which is
observed by the other DM(s). DM i ’s choice of action can convey information to the other DMs
depending on i ’s behaviour profile. Behavioural profiles simply refer to the different types of
DMs one might encounter. The behavioural profiles discussed in this paper correspond to
the GraphModel stability concepts outlined in the previous section: for example, a DMmay
move according to Nash stability. Thus, DM i has chosen action g i because it meets the criteria
set by its behavioural profile. Therefore, for a behavioural profile B and some result R , DM i
chooses g i such that R(g i |pi, Bi ) is optimized. Knowing this, the remaining DMs can surmise
that the preference rankings in which action g i does not optimize the desired result (which is
itself based on the behaviour profile) are removed from the initial set P(0)i of possible rankings
to generate an updated list, P(1)i .
Given the previous observation regarding the ability to map preference rankings to payoffs,
the algorithms work directly with payoffs in order to facilitate comparisons and calculations. It
is also assumed that the list of all possible payoffs has already been initialized and that the sets
unilateralMoves (for all DMs) and opponentUMs can be generated.
Thepseudocode for theREMOVEPAYOffS function is shown inAlgorithm1. The foundationof
this algorithm lies in the call of the ISMOVESANCTIONED Boolean function, which is analysed in
the next sections. The REMOVEPAYOffS function essentially verifies for which possible rankings
the observed action is consistent with the opponent’s assigned behavioural profile. Rankings
for which such an action is not compatible are removed from that opponent’s list of possible
rankings.
Algorithm 1 REMOVEPAYOffS(st artSt at e , endSt ate )
for ranking ∈ possibleRankings do
if ISMOVESANCTIONED(st artSt at e , endSt ate , ranking ) then
remove ranking
end if
end for
4.4.1 Default Behavioural Profile
In the most general case, the opponent’s behaviour profile can be completely unknown; a
DM’s reasoning for staying at or moving from a given starting state is opaque. In this case, a
reasonable assumption is made about the opponents: they will never move to a state which is
less preferred to the state that it is starting from. In otherwords, it is assumed that the opponent
will not move in a way that might harm them.
Given a starting state s , there are two possibilities: either DM i stays at state s or DM i moves
away from state s to state t . In the former case, no information is gained; i ’s motivation for
staying at s is unknown. However, in the latter case, it can be conjectured that state t , is greater
than or equally preferred to s . Rankings in which t ≺ s can thus be removed from the list of the
DM’s possible rankings. Algorithm 2 illustrates the procedure for removing payoffs when an
opponent’s profile is set to default.
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Algorithm 2 ISMOVESANCTIONED (DEFAULT)(st artSt at e , endSt ate , ranking )
if st artSt at e > endSt ate then
return True
else
return False
end if
A move is sanctioned for a default type DM if the end state is less preferred to the start
state. Thus, when called by REMOVEPAYOffS function, payoffs in which this condition is met are
discarded: since the DMmoved from st artSt at e to endSt ate , rankings in which endSt ate is
strictly less preferred to st artSt at e are excluded since it is assumed that the DM never moves
to a less preferred state.
To summarize, the default profile behaves as follows:
• If DM i stays at s , no rankings are removed because no information is gained
• If DM i moves away from s to a state t , remove rankings in which s i t because it must
be that t %i s
4.4.2 Nash Profile
Recall that a state s is Nash stable if and only if there is no unilateral improvement from s .
Since Nash stability is limited to the focal DM’s moves, it does not require knowledge of the
opponent(s) preferences. Accordingly, for a DMwith a Nash profile, from some starting state s ,
two behaviours can occur: DM i stays at s or DM i moves away from s . In the first case, this
means that there are no UIs for DM i from s , hence s is Nash stable for i . In other words, at a
Nash stable state s , the states reachable from s are less than or equally preferred to s . Preference
rankings in which s ≺i t for t ∈ Ri (s ) are thus removed from the possible rankings.
In the second case, this means that state t represents a UI from s , i.e., s ≺i t . Preference
rankings in which s %i t can thus be removed from the possible rankings. Furthermore, this
also means that t is greater than or equally preferred to the other states in the set of reachable
states from s (i.e., t is the most or equally preferred UI). Preference rankings in which t ≺i u for
u ∈ Ri (s ) can also be removed from the possible rankings. Algorithm 3 details the procedure
for checking for sanctioning when the opponent has a Nash behavioural profile.
Since the DM is assumed to be a Nash player, they will stay at a Nash stable state and move
away from states when there are UIs available. Note that there is no guarantee that the state
moved to is Nash stable; it is simply a UI from the starting state. In other words, a DMmoving
from st artSt at e to endSt ate is signalling that endSt ate is strictly more preferred to st artSt at e .
Furthermore, the DM is also signalling that endSt ate is the most preferred state in the set of
the DM’s UMs from st artSt at e .
To summarize, the Nash profile behaves as follows:
• If DM i stays at s , remove rankings in which s ≺i t for t ∈ Ri (s ) because t -i s
• If DM i moves away from s to state t , remove rankings in which s %i t because s ≺i t and
those in which t ≺i u for u ∈ Ri (s ) because t %i u
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Algorithm 3 ISMOVESANCTIONED (NASH)(st artSt at e , endSt ate , ranking )
if endSt ate , st artSt at e then
if endSt ate - st artSt at e then
return True
end if
end if
for st at e in unilateralMoves(st artSt at e ) do
if endSt ate ≺ st at e then
return True
end if
end for
return False
4.4.3 GMR Profile
A state s is GMR stable for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s ) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN−i (s1)
with s2 -i s (Howard 1971). In other words, every UI that DM i has from s is sanctioned by an
opponent UM; DM i anticipates that taking any one of its available UIs from s will result in a
less preferred state once the opponent(s) counter-moves. Given this, and assuming that DMs
are acting according to the behavioural profile that characterises this stability concept, there
are two cases to consider: DM i stays at s or DM i moves away from s .
If DM i stays at s , this means that s is GMR or Nash stable for i , i.e., that either all of i ’s
UIs from s are sanctioned by opponent UMs or there are no UIs. Thus, rankings which do not
result in s being Nash stable (those in which t ≺i s ) or GMR stable state (those in which the UIs
from s are not sanctioned by opponent UMs) can thus be removed from the set of possible
rankings.
If DM i moves from s to t , this means that s is not GMR or Nash stable for i , i.e., there is at
least one unsanctioned UI, t , from s . First, note that t is a UI from s , i.e., s ≺i t . Any rankings
in which s %i t can thus be removed from the list of possible rankings. Next, one knows that
i ’s movement to t is not sanctioned by opponent UMs; any rankings in which such a move
is sanctioned can thus also be removed from the list of possible rankings. The procedure for
verifying sanctioning for an opponent with a GMR profile is outlined in Algorithm 4.
The algorithm begins by checking whether st artSt at e and endSt ate are the same. If this
is the case (i.e., the DM decided to stay), the state is checked for GMR stability. If the start
and end states are different, DM has signalled that endSt ate is a UI from st artSt at e . In other
words, the move from st artSt at e to endSt ate is not sanctioned. To check sanctioning for a
GMR player in this case, it is necessary to verify that opponent moves from the UIs are less
than or equally preferred to the starting state.
To summarize, the GMR profile behaves as follows:
• If DM i stays at s , remove rankings inwhich states inR+i (s ) are not sanctionedby opponent
UMs
• If DM i moves away from s to t , remove rankings in which t -i s because t should be a UI
from s and those in which opponents can move from t to a state which is less preferred
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Algorithm 4 ISMOVESANCTIONED (GMR)(st artSt at e , endSt ate , ranking )
if st artSt at e = endSt ate then
for st at e in UIs(st artSt at e ) do
if not ISMOVESANCTIONED (GMR)(st artSt at e , st at e , ranking ) then
return True
end if
end for
return False
end if
if endSt ate - st artSt at e then
return True
end if
for st at e in opponentsUMs(endSt ate ) do
if st at e - st artSt at e then
return True
end if
end for
return False
to s
4.4.4 SEQ Profile
A state s is SEQ stable for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s ) there exists at least one s2 ∈ R+N−i (s1)with
s2 -i s (Howard 1971). This definition is identical to GMR stability with the exception that the
set of opponent UIs, rather than opponent UMs is considered. This case is muchmore difficult
to implement as an inverse engineering algorithm since one assumes that an SEQDM is aware
of each of the other DMs’ preferences.
Thus, state s is SEQ stable for DM i if every UI that DM i has from s is credibly sanctioned
by an opponent. Once gain, DM i can stay at s or move away from s .
If DM i stays at s , this means that s is SEQ or Nash stable for i , i.e., that either all of i ’s UIs
from s are sanctioned by opponent UIs or there are no UIs available. Rankings which do not
result in s being Nash stable (those in which t ≺i s ) or SEQ stable (those in which the UIs from
s are not sanctioned by opponent UIs) are removed from the set of possible rankings.
If DM i moves from s to t , this means that s is not SEQ or Nash stable for i , i.e., there is at
least one unsanctioned UI, t , from s . First, note that t is a UI from s , i.e., s ≺i t . Any rankings
in which s %i t can thus be removed from the list of possible rankings. Next, one knows that
i ’s movement to t is not sanctioned by opponent UIs; any rankings in which such a move
is credibly sanctioned can also be removed. The procedure for verifying sanctioning for an
opponent with an SEQ profile is quite similar to that for the GMR profile and is outlined in
Algorithm 5.
The algorithm first checks whether st artSt at e and endSt ate are the same. If this is the case
(i.e., the DM decided to stay), the state is checked for SEQ stability. If the start and end states
are different, this means that endSt ate is a UI from st artSt at e . To check sanctioning for an
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Algorithm 5 ISMOVESANCTIONED (SEQ)(st artSt at e , endSt ate , ranking )
if st artSt at e = endSt ate then
for st at e in UIs(st artSt at e ) do
if not ISMOVESANCTIONED (GMR)(st artSt at e , st at e , ranking ) then
return True
end if
end for
return False
end if
if endSt ate - st artSt at e then
return True
end if
for st at e in opponentsUIs(endSt ate ) do
if st at e - st artSt at e then
return True
end if
end for
return False
SEQ player in this case, it is necessary to verify that opponent UIs from the focal DM’s UIs are
less than or equally preferred to the starting state.
To summarize, the SEQ profile behaves as follows:
• If DM i stays at s , remove rankings inwhich states inR+i (s ) are not sanctionedby opponent
UIs
• If DM i moves away from s to t , remove rankings in which t -i s because t should be a UI
from s and those in which opponents can move from t to a state which is less preferred
to s
It should be noted that the SEQ profile is applicable only to conflicts with two DMs. The
reason for this is that the set opponentsUIs(endSt ate ) is clearly defined only when the UIs are
known for all of the opponents. Although the observing DM’s preference ranking is known
to all of the other DMs, there is no guarantee that they are aware of each others’ preferences.
This makes the set opponentsUIs(endSt ate ) difficult to ascertain. The DMwith an SEQ profile
checks whether its UIs are sanctioned by UIs from both the observing DM and from any other
DM in the conflict; in order to know whether the sanctioning move is a UI, knowledge of all
preferences is required.
4.4.5 SMR Profile
A state s is SMR stable for DM i iff for every s1 ∈ R+i (s ) there exists at least one s2 ∈ RN−i (s1) such
that s2 -i s and s3 -i s for every s3 ∈ Ri (s2) (Howard 1971). The DMwill stay at state s if, even
after being able to respond to opponent sanctions, the resulting state(s) is/are less preferred to
s . As usual, two things can occur: DM i remains at s or DM i moves away from s . In the former
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case, s is SMR or Nash stable. As was the case with GMR stability, one cannot know why i is
choosing to stay; it could be that i has no UIs from s or that i ’s move to a UI is SMR sanctioned.
Rankings which are compatible with this hypothesis are kept; those which are incompatible
are discarded.
If DM i moves, then s is not SMR stable for DM i , i.e., there is at least one unsanctioned UI,
t , from s . First, note that t is a UI from s ; rankings in which s - t can be removed from the list
of possible rankings. Next, note that i ’s move to t is unsanctioned; any rankings in which this
move is sanctioned can therefore also be removed from the list of possible rankings. Finally,
the DM’s should have a counter-move available which is more preferred to the starting state.
Algorithm 6 ISMOVESANCTIONED (SMR)(st artSt at e , endSt ate , ranking )
if st artSt at e = endSt ate then
for st at e in UIs(st artSt at e ) do
if not ISMOVESANCTIONED (SMR)(st artSt at e , st at e , ranking ) then
return True
end if
end for
return False
end if
if endSt ate - st artSt at e then
return True
end if
for st at e in opponentUMs(endSt ate ) do
counterMoveExist s = False
if st at e - st artSt at e then
for counterMove in counterMoves(st at e ) do
if counterMove  st artSt at e then
counterMoveExist s = True
end if
if counterMoveExist s = False then
return True
end if
end for
end if
end for
return False
The algorithm begins by checking whether st artSt at e and endSt ate are the same; if this is
the case, the state is checked for SMR stability.
If st artSt at e and endSt ate are different, it is necessary to check whether the move from
st artSt at e to endSt ate is SMR sanctioned. The move is SMR sanctioned if there exists a state t
in the opponents’ UMs from endSt ate satisfying (1) t - st artSt at e and (2) every counter move
from t is less than or equally preferred to st artSt at e .
To summarize, the SMR profile behaves as follows:
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• If DM i stays at s , remove rankings inwhich states inR+i (s ) are not sanctionedby opponent
UMs once DM i has the chance to counter-move
• If DM i moves away from s to t , remove rankings in which t -i s and those in which
the move from s to t is sanctioned after the opponents move to a UM and DM i has the
chance to counter-move
4.5 Advice Function
Once observations have been logged and preference rankings updated, this information is
highly useful to the focal or observingDM,who can use them tomakemore informed decisions.
The ADVICE function is called by the observing DM who would like information on how to
proceed from the current state s of the conflict. Upon calling on the ADVICE function, the
observing DM receives three pieces of information for s and for each of their UMs from s :
• Expected payoff value of the state: gives an (ordinal) expected payoff for s and for each
of the observing DM’s reachable states from s . The expected value takes a weighted
average of the focal DM’s payoff values based on all of the possible subsequent opponent
moves. This value gives the DM ameasure of the expected satisfaction for the state once
all possible opponent responses have been considered.
• Counter-move probabilities: for each state, gives a probabilistic appraisal of how the
opponents might react. In other words, given s or one of the observing DM’s reachable
states, the observing DM can then see how their opponents are likely to counter-move
from that state. This tells the focal DM how the conflict is likely to progress once their
move from state s has been made.
• Opponent reachable states: lists the states to which the opponents can move from each
of the observed DM’s available states, including the option to remain. In other words, for
s and for the reachable states from s , the opponent’s set of reachable states is included.
This reminds the observing DM of which states the observed DM is theoretically capable
of reaching.
4.5.1 Algorithms
The advice function given by Algorithm 7 provides the focal DMwith several important pieces
of information. Given the current state, ADVICE checks the focal DM’s unilateral moves from
that state. For each unilateral move, the algorithm loops through the opponents and through
each possible preference ranking for the opponent and calculates the opponent’s best response
to the unilateralmove. Once the functionBESTRESPONSES is run, the sample size is incremented
by the number of best responses in the output (theremay bemore than one best response). The
array numOccurrence records howmany times each feasible state appears as a best response.
The probability of each feasible state occurring at the immediate next step is calculated by
dividing the number of occurrences of each feasible state by the total sample size.
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Algorithm 7 ADVICE(currentSt at e )
for st at e ∈ unilateralMoves do
numOccurrences = [0,0,. . . ,0] . One zero in the list for each feasible state
sampleSize = 0
for opponent ∈ opponentList do
for ranking s ∈ possibleRankings do
responses = BESTRESPONSES(st at e , ranking )
sampleSize← sampleSize + length(responses)
for numOccurrence ∈ numOccurrences do
Add number of times the feasible state occurs in responses to numOccurrence
end for
end for
probabilities = numOccurrences/sampleSize . List obtained by dividing each
numOccurrence by the sample size
expectedValue = expected value of payoff using probabilities
Add state, its expected value and its probability to adviceStates
end for
return adviceStates
end for
The focal DM’s expected value for each state is then calculated based on the probabilities
and on the DM’s own preference ranking. For example, if the probabilities for states s1, s2,
s3 and s4 are 30%, 20%, 10% and 40%, respectively and the focal DM’s preference ranking is
s4  s1  s2 ∼ s3 with associated payoffs 4, 3, 2, and 2, then the expected values are E (s1) =
3 · 0.3 = 0.9, E (s2) = 2 · 0.2 = 0.4, E (s3) = 2 · 0.1 = 0.2, and E (s4) = 4 · 0.4 = 1.6
The key step in the above algorithm is determining the opponent’s best responses. These are
moves that the opponent makes which are consistent with that opponent’s behavioural profile.
As such, opponents with divergent behavioural profiles will have different best response sets.
For example, an opponent with a Nash behavioural profile is not concerned about possible
sanctioning, while a GMR opponent will not move to states that could be sanctioned; the Nash
DM’s set of best responses thus includes states which the GMR’s set does not. Algorithm 8
shows how the best response is computed. The heart of this algorithm is calling the function
ISSANCTIONED, whose Boolean output (True/False) depends on the behavioural profile.
Algorithm 8 BESTRESPONSES(st at e , ranking )
bestResponses← [ ]
for state in unilateralMoves do
if not ISSANCTIONED then
add outcome to bestResponses
end if
end for
return bestResponses
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The opponent’s behavioural profile is therefore useful at two steps in the overall process.
First, it assists with the removal of infeasible preferences; second, it allows for a more exact
determination of best responses, which eventually contributes to providing useful advice. The
use of behavioural profiles in the advice stage ensures that expected values and probabilities
truly reflect how the conflict could unfold; including sanctioned states in an opponent’s best
response list would skew the results.
4.5.2 Complexity
Given a conflict with s feasible states, the number of possible rankings of those states is given by
the ordered Bell number (Good 1975) which is approximated by Bell (s ) ≈ s !2(ln 2)s+1 (Gross 1975).
Ordered Bell numbers quickly become quite large and, as such, are the source of limitations
regarding the space and time complexity of the algorithms presented thus far.
With respect to storage space, saving the list of all possible rankings is simply not feasible
for conflicts with 12 states or more. Assuming that four bits are used to store the numerical
ranking of a state, up to 16 states can be ranked; if a conflict has more than 16 feasible states, 8
bits are needed to store each state’s ranking. Table 4.1 shows the space required to store the
number of possible rankings for conflicts with 8 - 17 feasible states. As the table illustrates,
the storage space needed quickly reaches the order of terabytes for conflicts with 13 states,
petabytes for conflicts with 15 states, and exabytes for conflicts with 17 states. The amount of
storage needed could be reduced by further compressing the data; however, reading the data
from the compressed file is slower than computing the possible rankings from scratch. Thus,
rather than attempting to store any of the data, the possible rankings should be generated
from scratch at each iteration, then discarded.
Number of
feasible states
Number of possible rankings Storage Requirement
8 545 835 2MB
9 7 087 261 32MB
10 102 247 563 511MB
11 1 622 632 57 3 9GB
12 28 091 567 595 169GB
13 526 858 348 381 3TB
14 10 641 342 970 443 74TB
15 230 283 190 977 853 2PB
16 5 315 654 681 981 355 43PB
17 130 370 767 029 135 901 2EB
Table 4.1: Storage space requirements for number of feasible states, assuming 4 bits are used
to store each state’s ranking value. The storage requirement quickly increases with the number
of feasible states.
With the number of opponents as constants and the number of states in a DM’s set of UMs
limited to at most s , three additional factors affect time complexity. First and foremost, O ( s !ln 2s )
time is required to loop through the list of possible rankings. Second, it is necessary to cycle
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through the focal DM’s UMs, which adds at most a factor of s . Third, time is required to verify
whether a ranking is valid or not given the opponent’s behavioural profile. This time depends
on the opponent’s behavioural profile: O(1) time is required for the Default profile; O(s ) time is
required for the Nash profile; O(s2) time is required in the worst case for the GMR profile; and
O(s3) is required in the worst case for the SMR profile. Thus, in the worst case, the algorithm
runs in O ( s4 ·s !ln 2s ) time.
As a reference point, running the ADVICE function on two observed moves for a conflict
with 11 states on a typical home computer took between 19 hours and 10minutes and 59 hours
and 40 minutes depending on the opponent profile. Althoughmany conflicts studied using
the GraphModel have 11 feasible states or less, many others have 12 states or more.
Finding ways to optimise the performance of the ADVICE function remains a key research
step. Some ideas under consideration include implementing parallel computing, using spe-
cialty research servers, and removing certain infeasible rankings from the outset. For example,
it may be known that a certain state is (or is not) a given DM’s most/least preferred state; in
this case, any rankings which do not satisfy this condition need not be considered.
4.5.3 Special Cases
Before moving on to the first case study, it will be useful to highlight cases in which the inverse
engineering algorithms might return an empty set of feasible rankings for one or more oppon-
ents. One reason for this is that the behavioural profile assigned to the opponent is incorrect;
as such, the opponent’s behaviour is inconsistent with the behavioural profile, which leads to
the eventual removal of all feasible rankings. This situation occurs in the case study presented
in Section 4.6.
Next, an empty set of feasible states could be indicative of a change in preferences. Thus,
the behaviour observed at a given point in the conflict could potentially be at odds with the
DM’s new preference ranking and with their subsequent actions.
Finally, opponentswhopurposely deviate from their behavioural profiles (e.g. in an attempt
at trickery) could render the set of feasible rankings empty. Once again, this is because their
observed behaviour would, at times, be consistent with their true preferences rankings, and at
times be inconsistent with it.
As the discussion above has shown, there is something of a “safeguard" built into the
inverse engineering methodology. Although it is essentially a true/false flag, knowing that the
set of feasible preference rankings of an opponent is empty helps the observing DM realise
that something is amiss. Diagnosing the problem is not necessarily straightforward, but the
DM at least is cognisant of the fact that additional verification is required: it may be that the
opponent’s preferences have changed over time, that the behavioural profile assigned to them
is incorrect, or that the opponent has attempted to engage in deception.
4.6 Application
Consider the 2-DM conflict model described in (Hipel 2001). Developers (D) heading a project
are monitored by environmentalists (E). The developers can choose sustainable development
or not. Environmentalists, on the other hand, can be proactive or reactive.
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Table 4.2: DMs and outcomes for sustainable development conflict
Environmentalists
Proactive 1 1 0 0
Developer
Sustainable Development 1 0 1 0
State s1 s2 s3 s4
The GraphModel representation of this conflict is shown in Figure 4.1 where the solid lines
represent the environmentalists’ UMs and the dashed lines correspond to the developer’s UMs.
DMmoves are assumed to be reversible and thus are represented by bidirectional arcs. Notice,
for example, that the developers have a UM from state s1 to state s2 by changing its option
selection from practising sustainable development (a 1 is opposite this option in Table 4.2 for
state s1) to not choosing sustainable development (as indicated by a 0 opposite sustainable
development for s2), while the environmentalists do not change their option choice (a 1 is
placed opposite the option proactive for both states s1 and s2). This UM for the developers is
portrayed by the dashed arrow line going from state s1 to state s2 at the top of Figure 4.1.
s1 s2
s3 s4
E
D
Figure 4.1: GraphModel of the sustainable development conflict
4.6.1 Starting Point
At the beginning of the conflict, the environmentalists have no information about the de-
veloper’s preferences and are thus unable to exclude any preference rankings outright. Given
the number of options, there are Bell (4) = 75 possible preference rankings for the developers
(from Equation 4.1). It is assumed that the environmentalists’ preferences are known to be
s1 ∼E s2 E s3 E s4 (with corresponding payoffs 4, 4, 3, and 2, respectively). The analysis is
being conducted from the environmentalists’ point of view.
The environmentalists are interested in discovering the developer’s true preference ranking,
which is s2 D s1 D s3 D s4. The conflict begins at status quo state s4 in which neither DM
has selected their option. Suppose that the developer moves first and takes the conflict into
state s3 by selecting the option for sustainable development. Upon observing this move, the
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environmentalists apply the inverse engineering and advice algorithms (1st iteration). Next,
the environmentalists respond by moving from state s3 to state s1. Then, the developers move
the conflict from state s1 to state s2; this move is once again observed by the environmentalists
(2nd iteration). Once the conflict at in state s2, neither DMmakes any moves (3rd iteration).
4.6.2 General Observations
For reference, Table 4.3 summarizes how many rankings remain once each algorithm has
removed infeasible preference rankings.
Table 4.3: Number of rankings remaining after iterations of the algorithms for developer ranking
Profile 1st iteration 2nd iteration 3rd iteration
Default 44 26 26
Nash 31 13 13
GMR 19 0 0
SMR 25 9 9
First, some general observations: at each of the first two iterations, regardless of behaviour
profile, the set of possible preference rankings is reduced; the final iteration yields no additional
information on the possible preference ranking. This is not surprising given that by the third
iteration, it is difficult for this small conflict to provide any new information.
When the developer’s profile is set to ’default’, less rankings are removed at each iteration
compared to the other behaviour profiles. Since the ’default’ profile is by design the most
conservative in terms of ranking removal, this is to be expected. Given how the removal is
executed in this case, rankings in which s3 ≺ s4 and s2 ≺ s1 are the only ones to be removed.
For the Nash profile, the first iteration removes more than half of the possible rankings; not
only are rankings in which s3 ≺ s4 excluded, but also those in which s3 ∼ s4 since a Nash DM
being indifferent between two states will not move from one to the other. At the end of the
second iteration, only 13 possible rankings remain.
If the developer is assumed to have a GMR behavioural profile, the first iteration of the
algorithms removes more rankings than any other profile. This is because the developers have
provided quite a bit of information: s4 is not a GMR stable state, which means that s3 is a UI
from s4; furthermore, s4 is an unsanctionedUI. After the second iteration, however, there are no
longer any possible preference rankings remaining. This means that the developer’s behaviour
is not consistent with a GMR profile; in other words, the assumption that the developers make
decisions based on GMR stability is incorrect.
To see why this is the case, note that the developers’ move from s1 to s2 means that s2
is an unsanctioned UI from s1. For the GMR profile, it is necessary to check to which state
the environmentalists can bring the conflict from s2 by considering their UMs. From s2, the
environmentalists have a UM to s4; s4 is the developers’ least preferred state, hence their UI
from s1 to s2 is GMR sanctioned by the threat of s4. Thus, assuming that the developer is a
GMR player, the move from s1 to s2 should not take place; the fact that it does means that the
developers are not behaving consistently with a GMRprofile. Thus, this information is valuable
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Table 4.4: Remaining preference rankings after three iterations
Default Profile Nash Profile SMR Profile GMR Profile
s3  s2  s1  s4 X X
∗s2  s1  s3  s4 X
s2  s3  s1  s4 X X
s3  s2  s4  s1 X X
s2  s3  s4  s1 X X
s3  s4  s2  s1 X
s3  s2  s4 ∼ s1 X X
s2  s1  s3 ∼ s4
s2  s3  s4 ∼ s1 X X
s3  s4  s1 ∼ s2
s3  s2  s1 ∼ s4
s2  s3 ∼ s1  s4 X
s3  s4 ∼ s2  s1 X
s2  s4 ∼ s3  s1
s3  s4 ∼ s2 ∼ s1
s2  s4 ∼ s3 ∼ s1
s2 ∼ s1  s3  s4
s2 ∼ s3  s1  s4 X X
s2 ∼ s3  s4  s1 X X
s4 ∼ s3  s2  s1
s2 ∼ s1  s4 ∼ s3
s2 ∼ s3  s4 ∼ s1 X X
s4 ∼ s3  s2 ∼ s1
s2 ∼ s3 ∼ s1  s4
s4 ∼ s3 ∼ s2  s1
s4 ∼ s3 ∼ s2 ∼ s1
* Developer’s true preference ranking
insofar as it provides insight into the developer’s behaviour: one can rule out the possibility
that the developers conform to the GMR profile.
Finally, assuming that the developers have an SMR profile, 25 rankings are removed at the
first iteration. The second iteration, however, leaves only nine possible preference rankings.
The developer’s movement from a given state signals that the state from which it moved is not
SMR; a UI is available either because it is unsanctioned by opponent UMs or since the focal
DM is able to escape the sanction.
Table 4.4 shows the rankings that remain after the three iterations for each behaviour profile.
For simplicity, the 26 rankings remaining in the default profile are listed in full; those which
remain for Nash, GMR, or SMR are subsets of the list of 26 and are denoted by a checkmark (X)
in the appropriate column. The developer’s true preference ranking is highlighted in bold and
preceded by an asterisk (*).
Note that the developer’s true preference ranking is contained in the lists generated by both
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the default and Nash profile algorithms. This indicates that, given its true preferences, the
developer’s behaviour is consistent with both a default and Nash behavioural profile. This is
not, however, the case with SMR: the developer’s true preferences are not present in the list
generated by the algorithm. If it is assumed that the developers always move in accordance to
their behaviour profiles, this absence means that the developers are not SMR DMs. In fact, it is
simple to verify that if the developers were truly SMRDMs, they would not have moved from s1
to s2: such a move is sanctioned by an opponent move to state s4, from which the only possible
counter-move to s3 is less preferred to s1.
Thus, in this case, the environmentalists have mistakenly attributed an SMR profile to
the developers and although the algorithm generates a non-empty list of possible rankings,
the true ranking is not among them. This emphasizes the importance of attributing a proper
behavioural profile to the DMwhose preferences one wishes to uncover. While some profiles
may eventually be discarded once they generate an empty list of rankings, this may not always
occur; it remains the responsibility of the modeller to carefully determine the appropriate
behavioural profile.
4.6.3 Advice Function
Given a list of possible opponent rankings, the next step is to use this information to improve
one’s own decision-making: the ADVICE function is created in order to facilitate this process.
Just like their opponent(s), the focal DM also has its own behavioural profile. The advice
function provides counsel based on a range of behavioural profiles, leaving the final decision
to the DM.
Table 4.5 summarizes the results obtained for each of the behavioural profiles that could
be assigned to the developers. Based on these results, the environmentalists should move to
state s1 regardless of the developers’ behavioural profile if they wish to maximise their payoff
for the immediate next step. In all cases except SMR, the developer is most likely to remain at
state s1 in response.
When the developers are assumed to have a default behavioural profile, their move from
state s4 to state s3 reduces the number of possible rankings from an initial 75 to 44. From state
s3, the environmentalists can either remain (top sub-row of Default row of Table 4.6) or move
to state s1 (bottom sub-row of Default row of Table 4.6). In the former case, the expected value
is 2.77. Based on the environmentalists’ preference ranking which assigns a payoff of 4 to states
s1 and s2, a payoff of 3 to state s3, and a payoff of 2 to state s4, remaining at s3 is expected to
fall slightly below the payoff value of state s3. This is because at the next immediate step, the
developers have a 22.8% chance of moving from s3 back to s4, but a 77.2% chance of staying at
s3.
If, however, the environmentalists were to move from state s3 to state s1 rather than stay at
s3, the expected value is now 4; based on the possible developer preference rankings, there
is a 37.1% chance that the developers will move from s1 to s2 and a 62.9% chance that the
developers will stay. Either case is acceptable to the environmentalists as states s1 and s2 are
tied as their most preferred state. The last column of the table lists which states are reachable
for the opponent (in this case, the developers) from states s3 and s1, respectively.
If the developers are assumed to have a Nash profile, 31 possible rankings remain once
the environmentalists update the list. As before, the environmentalists can choose to either
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Table 4.5: Environmentalists’ ADVICE function from s3 after observing the developers move
from state s4 to state s3.
Profile Number of pos-
sible rankings
(1st iteration)
Expected pay-
off values
Counter-move
probabilities
Developer’s
reachable
states
Default 44 s3: 2.77
s4 = 22.8% {s3, s4}s3 = 77.2%
s1: 4 s2 = 37.1% {s1, s2}s1 = 62.9%
Nash 31
s3: 3 s3 = 100% {s3, s4}
s1: 4 s2 = 41.9% {s1, s2}s1 = 58.1%
GMR 19 s3: 3 s3 = 100% {s3, s4}
s1: 4 s1 = 100% {s1, s2}
SMR 25
s3: 3 s3 = 100% {s3, s4}
s1: 4 s1 = 36% {s1, s2}s2 = 64%
remain at state s3 or move to state s1.
In the first case, they can be assured that the conflict will remain at state s3. Indeed, by
examining the developer’s preference ranking, one can see why this is the case: state s3 is in
fact Nash stable for the developers since there are no available UIs. Thus, the environmental-
ists can see that although the developers can, in theory, move the conflict to state s4, this is
unlikely to occur. This type of information is useful to the focal DMwho can see whether some
opponentmoves are indeed possible. Knowing that certain opponentmoves have a zero or low
probability of occurring could help overcome sanctioning concerns. The environmentalists
can see that staying at state s3 is "safe": the developers will not move back to state s4, which is
the environmentalists’ least preferred state.
In the second case, the environmentalists can move from state s3 to state s1. As in the
situation with the unknown profile, the environmentalists are guaranteed a payoff of 4 since
they are indifferent between the developers moves to s1 and to s2.
If the developers are assumed to have a GMR behavioural profile, observing their initial
move allows the list of possible rankings to be reduced to 19. Based on the remaining rankings,
the expected value of the environmentalists’ decision to stay at s3 is 3, while that of moving to
state s1 is 4. In this situation, the developer’s next move is known with certainty in both cases:
the developer will stay at s3 and stay at s1 even though there are other moves available.
Finally, if the developers are assumed to have an SMR behavioural profile, the number of
rankings is reduced to 25. If the environmentalists decide to remain at state s3, their expected
value is 3, and the developers will remain at state s3. If the environmentalists move from state
s3 to state s1, they can expect a payoff of 4.
Based on the information provided by the ADVICE function, the environmentalists would
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make the same decision regardless of the developer’s behavioural profile. A move to s1 would,
in all cases, yield a payoff of 4 at the next immediate play. Now assume that the environment-
alists take this advice and move from state s3 to state s1 and that the developers respond by
moving from state s1 to state s2. Once the developer’s possible rankings have been updated,
the environmentalists once again seek advice.
The results of the next call of the ADVICE function are shown in Table 4.6. Based on these
results, the environmentalists should stay at s2 if they wish to maximise their payoff for the
immediate next step, regardless of the developers’ behavioural profile. If the environmentalists
remain at s2, the developers will certainly remain if they are either Nash or SMR and are very
likely to remain if they are Default. The results also show that the sequence of moves by the
developer is inconsistent with a GMR behavioural profile.
Table 4.6: Environmentalists’ ADVICE function from state s2 after observing the developers
move from state s1 to state s2.
Profile Number of pos-
sible rankings
(2nd iteration)
Expected pay-
off values
Counter-move
probabilities
Developer’s
reachable
states
Default 26 s4: 2.5
s4 = 50% {s3, s4}s3 = 50%
s2: 4 s2 = 76.5% {s1, s2}s1 = 23.5%
Nash 13
s4: 3 s3 = 100% {s3, s4}
s2: 4 s2 = 100% {s1, s2}
GMR 0
SMR 9 s4: 3 s3 = 100% {s3, s4}
s2: 4 s2 = 100% {s1, s2}
In all cases, the number of possible rankings has decreased. Additionally, the number of
possible rankings that remain depends on the behavioural profile assigned to the developers; a
movemay providemore or less information depending on the profile. Note that the number of
possible states for the GMR behavioural profile is zero; this reveals that the developer’s actions
are inconsistent with the GMR profile.
When the developer is assumed to have a default profile, the environmentalists can expect
a higher payoff by remaining at state s2 rather thanmoving to state s4. This is because staying at
state s2 leaves the developers able tomove only to state s1which is tied as the environmentalists’
most preferred state. If the developers are assumed to have a Nash or SMR profile, the expected
payoff is higher if the environmentalists remain at s2. In both cases, the developer’s next moves
are deterministic; the environmentalists can be sure of where the conflict will go once they
choose to move.
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4.7 Chapter Summary
An inverse approach to preference elicitation in the GraphModel can be a useful tool for DMs
and analysts. Not only does it provide a way to more accurately gauge opponent preferences, it
also assists in real-time decision-making. Specifically, the information furnished by the ADVICE
function allows focal DMs to make improved strategic decisions based on up-to-date data.
This chapter highlights the ideas and algorithms underpinning the ADVICE function, which
relies on a DM’s behavioural profile to determine which moves would not occur and, as a
consequence, which states are likely to occur at the immediate next step. The expected value
gives the focal DM an idea of the ordinal value of each of their possible moves, while the next
state probabilities show the likelihood of the opponent’s immediate next move.
As demonstrated by the sustainable development application, the ADVICE function is a
useful decision-making tool; the focal DM is able to better assess the risks of moving away
from a state versus staying at that state. A particularly helpful piece of information is whether
the opponent is likely to, given its behavioural profile, actually move the conflict to all of
its reachable states. If this is not the case, the focal DM gains additional insights about the
possibility of sanctioning by the opponent.
Although this conflict is relatively small, the example clearly illustrates why the information
provided by the ADVICE function is quite relevant. The environmentalists are able to choose
their next move based on the expected value of that move and on how the conflict is likely
to evolve at the immediate next step. The analysis provided aids focal DMs in making more
enlightened decisions; depending on their levels of risk aversion, different focal DMsmight
choose different actions.
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Chapter 5
Kinder Morgan Case Study
5.1 Introduction
As the country with the third largest oil reserves in the world and as the world’s sixth largest
producer, Canada depends on oil extraction and refining processes for its economic develop-
ment (National Energy Board 2015a). Oil sandsmake up 90% of Canada’s reserves, with conven-
tional oil accounting for the remaining10% (National EnergyBoard2015b). Themost important
crude oil reserves in Canada are located in the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin, which
traverses parts of Yukon, Northwest Territories, British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan.
The oil is mainly produced in Alberta, which generated 77% of the country’s production in
2013 (National Energy Board 2014). The Alberta oil sands alone have an estimated 1.8 trillion
barrels of oil in place, of which an estimated 168 billion are ultimately recoverable (Natural
Resources Canada 2013).
A net oil exporter, Canada has historically exported most of its oil to the United States.
Recently, however, Canada has pushed for market expansion overseas to regions such as South
America, Europe, and Asia (National Energy Board 2015a). To this end, the government of
Canada has been trying to make use of the country’s extensive pipeline system, which covers
over 35,000 kilometres, to transport crude oil originating from Alberta’s oil sands to the coasts
for eventual shipping overseas.
The transportation of crude oil is primarily done using Canada’s pipeline system which has
lines transporting domestic crude oil to refineries and to the United States and transporting im-
ported crude oil to refineries (Natural Resources Canada 2014). In 2014, pipelines transported
more than seven times the crude oil exports than marine, rail, and trucks combined (National
Energy Board 2015b). Due to their scope, which often crosses provincial or international
boundaries, Canadian pipeline construction and expansion projects have been surrounded by
controversy.
The Trans Mountain Expansion Project (TMEP), managed by Trans Mountain Pipeline
Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Texas-based Kinder Morgan Inc, is designed
to expand the existing Trans Mountain pipeline that runs from Strathcona County, Alberta to
marketing terminals and refineries in Burnaby, British Columbia on Canada’s west coast (Trans
Mountain Pipeline ULC 2013). This project is wide in scope as it crosses many provincial
and regional boundaries within the country; consequently, it is currently at the centre of a
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conflict involving a range of stakeholders including municipalities, provincial governments,
First Nations, Trans Mountain, and environmental groups.
The goal of this chapter is to analyse this dispute using an inverse engineering approach,
which makes use of observable decision-maker (DM) actions to provide analysts with informa-
tion regarding possible evolutions of the conflict. This information is valuable to analysts and
DMs involved in the dispute who are deciding on their courses of action. As will be demon-
strated, the data provided are not only useful, but are also well suited to interpretation by a
variety of decision-making profiles.
5.2 Project Background
According to TMEP documents, the existing 1,150 km pipeline will be twinned, allowing for
greater oil transporting capacity from the current 300,000 to 890,000 barrels per day (Trans
Mountain Pipeline ULC 2013). Once completed, the new pipeline segment will carry heavy
crude oils, while the existing pipeline will carry refined products, synthetic crude oils, and
light crude oils. Approximately 980 km will be new pipeline and 193 km will be reactivated
pipeline (Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 2013). In addition to new pipeline, the project also
involves the construction of 12 pumping facilities, 19 new storage tanks, and 3 new berths
located in the Westridge Marine Terminal in Burnaby (Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 2013;
Kinder Morgan Canada Limited 2017b). For reference, a map of the TMEP is provided in
Figure 5.1. The analysis of this conflict is based on events up until November 2017.
5.2.1 Canadian Regulatory Approval Process
According to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA) and theNational En-
ergy Board Act (NEBA), the National Energy Board (NEB) is responsible for issuing a certificate
of public convenience and necessity for pipeline projects (Government of Canada 2014; Cana-
dian Environmental Assessment Act S.C. 2012, c.19, s.52 2014). The certificate is issued based
on whether the proposed project is in the public interest, which includes consideration of
economic, social, and environmental impacts (Becklumb 2012). Section 52(4) of theNEBA sets
a 15month time limit from the receipt of a complete application to the NEB’s recommendation
report (Government of Canada 2014). Based on the NEB’s assessments and recommendations,
theGovernor in Council "directs theNEB to issue a decision statement to the pipeline company
informing it of the decision" (Becklumb 2012).
Typically, NEB board members are tasked with overseeing the review of each pipeline
project in accordance with the Board’s regulatory framework. This framework is composed
of laws, requirements, and guidance: "[o]ur regulations, conditions and guidance start by
defining the safety and security, environmental protection and economic efficiency outcomes
(or performance objectives) to be achieved." (National Energy Board 2016c). Once a project has
been approved, the NEB continues to be involved in the oversight and compliance verification
of the project throughout its life cycle (National Energy Board 2016b).
In February 2018, the federal Liberal government announced new legislation to overhaul
the environmental assessment process for major natural resources projects ( An Act to enact
the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation
Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts (First Reading) 2018). The
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Figure 5.1: Trans Mountain Expansion Project Pipeline Route
Source: National Energy Board
bill, which has yet to pass into law, creates the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada, a single
agency which would review large projects and evaluate their environmental, health, social,
and economic impact. Pipeline projects in particular would be regulated by the Canadian
Energy Regulator (CER) which replaces the NEB. When asked whether the TMEP would be
approved under the new bill, Canada’s Environment Minister Catherine McKenna responded
in the affirmative (Tasker 2018).
On December 16, 2013, Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC filed its application with the NEB
for the TMEP (Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 2013). The application was considered complete
on April 2, 2014 (National Energy Board 2016a); however the NEB’s recommendation report
was not issued until May 2016. The delay was due to Trans Mountain changing its preferred
route corridor which resulted in additional hearings. Another source of delay was that one
of the NEB board members dismissed some of Trans Mountain’s filed evidence on oil market
supply and demand which then required the collection of additional information from Trans
Mountain and other intervenors (National Energy Board 2016a).
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In its May 19, 2016 report, the NEB recommended the approval of the TMEP subject to 157
conditions regarding pipeline safety; emergency preparedness and response; environmental
protection; ongoing consultation, particularly with Aboriginal communities; socio-economic
matters; financial responsibility; and affirmation of commercial support (National Energy
Board 2016a). On November 29, 2016 the Government in Council led by PrimeMinister Justin
Trudeau accepted the NEB’s recommendations and directed the NEB to issue the Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity for the TMEP (Governor in Council 2016; Office of the
PrimeMinister 2016).
Before Trans Mountain can begin full construction on the TMEP, it must file additional
documentation to the NEB to demonstrate its compliance with the conditions imposed on the
project (National Energy Board 2017a). Out of the 157 conditions, 98 necessitate additional
documentationprior to thebeginningof construction. Furthermore, thedetailedpipeline route
must go through the route approval process which is currently ongoing: many hearings were
scheduled in the summer and fall of 2017, while other hearings have yet to take place (National
Energy Board 2017c).
In addition to federal requirements, the TMEP is also subject to 37 conditions attached
to the Environmental Certificate received from the Government of British Columbia. These
conditions were issued on January 10, 2017 by the formerMinister of Environment, Mary Polak,
and the former Minister of Natural Gas Development, Rich Coleman (Polak and Coleman
2017). British Columbia’s Environmental Assessment Act requires that the province release its
own environmental assessment certificate for such projects, although it can rely on the NEB’s
process to arrive at its decision (Environmental Assessment Act SBC 2002, c. 43 2002). The
conditions pertain to Aboriginal engagement, public engagement, construction, regulation,
environment/socio-economics, and emergency response/preparedness (Government of Brit-
ish Columbia 2017), and are designed to supplement the conditions issued by the NEB (Polak
and Coleman 2017).
5.2.2 Major Issues
This is a large-scale, inter-provincial pipeline project, and, like many others before it, brings
several issues to the forefront. In recent years, pipeline projects have been the subject of many
controversies and ideological disagreement between those touting the economic benefits and
those concerned about the impacts on the environment and on First Nations. Furthermore,
pipelines also illustrate differences in power between the three levels of government: federal,
provincial, and municipal. Major issues related to the TMEP can be classified into four types:
economic benefits, environmental concerns, duty to consult, and balance of power.
Economic Benefits
According to a report issued by the Conference Board of Canada, the TMEP would result
in an estimated $18.5 billion in fiscal benefits during its development and over the first 20
years of operations (Burt 2016). It is also claimed that the project would generate 15,000 new
jobs during construction as well as 440 permanent jobs per year during operation (Natural
Resources Canada 2017). An analysis by the global consulting firmMuse Stancil commissioned
by Trans Mountain and submitted to the NEB as part of the application process found that the
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total benefits of the project could reach $73.5 billion (in 2012 Canadian dollars) for Canadian
crude oil producers (Earnest 2015).
This project is particularly important for the diversification of Canada’s oil export markets,
the underlying assumption being that diversifying Canada’s oil market would result in higher
prices for Canadian oil. The project would allow exportation to "Washington State and north-
east Asia (Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan) and to secondary markets in the United
States such as California, Hawaii and Alaska" (Natural Resources Canada 2017). In its recom-
mendation report, the NEB board found that "there would be a considerable benefit gained by
providing Canadian shippers with more flexible and diverse markets, the ability to manage
risk associated with competing in multiple markets, the ability to manage development and
operational risk, and a likely reduction of discounts to Canadian crude" (National Energy Board
2016a).
These benefits have been challenged by several economists, notably by Robyn Allan and
by David Hughes who argue that many of the stated benefits of the TMEP do not hold up to
scrutiny. Both argue that the Canadian crude discount is not a discount, but a result of the
transportation cost of Canadian oil (Allan 2016; Hughes 2017). According to Allan, there are
no Asian markets for Alberta’s oil (Allan 2016), while Hughes states that due to transportation
costs, Canadian heavy oil would sell at a lower price thanU.S. oil in Asia (Hughes 2017). Hughes
also highlights the fact that Muse Stancil’s report was based on several assumptions which
no longer hold, including an overestimation of oil supply and that no other pipeline projects
would be built (Hughes 2017).
Environmental Concerns
Environmental groups oppose the project based on concerns about the TMEP’s impact on
the environment and on climate change. The Raincoast Conservation Foundation and Living
Oceans Society argues in its filing that the NEB’s environmental assessment, which did not
include an analysis of the impacts of marine shipping, violated the requirements of the Species
at Risk Act (SARA). Under the SARA, "If a wildlife species is listed as an extirpated species, an
endangered species or a threatened species, the competent minister must prepare a strategy
for its recovery" (Species at Risk Act S.C. 2002, c. 29 2014). Given that the TMEPwould affect the
habitat of killer whales along the coast, a submission of mitigation measures was required, but
not submitted since the project’s impact on marine shipping was not evaluated (Kung 2017).
The City of Burnaby and the City of Vancouver have been vocal opponents of the TMEP. In
their court filings, both cities contend that the NEB failed the statutory requirements set out in
the CEAA and in theNEBA (Kung 2017). More specifically, the City of Burnaby argues that the
NEB did not consider alternate locations for one of the marine terminals and that the NEB
did not collect evidence regarding the project risks until after the GIC approved the project.
The City of Vancouver’s claims are centred around the lack of proper assessment of marine
activities, of the effects of greenhouse gas emissions, and of proper spills assessment.
Trans Mountain argues that transporting oil via pipelines rather than shipping it in tankers
trucks or rail cars results in "safer, more efficient and more economic shipment of oil between
Alberta and BC" (Trans Mountain 2017).
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Duty to Consult and Land Rights
Under the Canadian Constitution, Aboriginal peoples’ rights are protected; however, there are
no clear guidelines surrounding consent (Nosek 2017). As such, Indigenous opposition or lack
of consent onmajor projects such as pipelines "may or may not have an impact on whether
the project proceeds" (Boreal Leadership Council 2015). In fact, the Crown’s duty is limited to
consultation with Indigenous communities and does not extend to reaching agreement with
these communities on projects that could significantly impact them.
What’s more, the Crown is legally allowed to delegate parts of the consultation to project
proponents (i.e., to pipeline companies) and to "discharge its duty to consult and accommod-
ate through the environmental assessment process" (Nosek 2017). This typically results in
Indigenous communities having little control or input over natural resource development
projects.
First Nations opposition to pipeline projects has taken on many different forms, including
issuing declarations and filing lawsuits. Declarations such as the Coastal First Nations Declar-
ation (Coastal First Nations Declaration 2010), the Save The Fraser Declaration (Indigenous
Nations of the Fraser River Watershed 2010), the International Treaty to Protect the Salish
Sea (International Treaty to Protect the Salish Sea 2014), and Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands
Expansion (Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion 2015) have been signed by hundreds
of First Nations.
In addition to issuing declarations asserting their land rights, First Nations are also em-
ploying legal tools to challenge the NEB’s initial decision to approve the project. Broadly
speaking, First Nations are opposed to the project on the grounds that the NEB’s consultation
was fundamentally inadequate and that, as a result, the decision to recommend the TMEP
for approval was not truly made in the public interest. As Elin Sigurdson, counsel for Upper
Nicola Band, summarized in the opening argument: "[a] decision by the government that is
not procedurally fair, that contravenes legislative requirements, and that is contrary to the
honour of the Crown and its constitutional duty to advance reconciliation with Indigenous
peoples – is not in the public interest" (Kung 2017). A summary of appeals filed by First Nations
is included in Table 5.1.
Balance of Power
In theory, the federal government’s decision to approve the TMEP takes precedence over
whatever opinions provincial and municipal governments may have on the matter; however,
both municipal and provincial governments have permit-granting powers which they can use
to their advantage (Hoberg 2013). For example, the City of Burnaby has yet to issue any permits
for the TMEP, causing construction delays (Graveland 2017); such delaying tactics are also
available to the government of BC (Clogg et al. 2017). This has created tensions among the
provincial governments of Alberta and BC, as well as among Alberta and the cities of Burnaby
and Vancouver (Graveland 2017).
In a 2013 article in which he develops a framework for political risk analysis applied to
pipeline conflicts, Hoberg states that although it is unclear if a province could impede a federally
approved project, "provincial authority is considered a "potential" veto point." (Hoberg 2013).
A similar argument could bemade formunicipalities which are in opposition to the TMEP such
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Plaintiff Summary of Argument
Coldwater Indian
Band
The Crown neglected its duty to consult based on the lack of proper
assessment of the TMEP’s impact on the Coldwater Band’s main water
source.
Squamish Nation The full impacts of the TMEP on the Squamish Nation’s land, water,
and resources have not yet been evaluated; the information will not
be available until after construction is already underway.
Stk’emlupsemc Te
SecwepemcNation
(SSN)
The Crown did not adequately consult the SSN; in particular, the
pipeline passes through a sacred site and sensitive grasslands.
Sto:lo The Crown neglected its duty to consult with respect to the established
food, social, and ceremonial fishing rights of the Sto:lo. Issues raised
by the Sto:lo during consultation were not adequately addressed.
Tsleil-Waututh Na-
tion
The Crown neglected its duty to consult and unlawfully excluded mar-
ine shipping from the environmental assessment.
Upper Nicola Band TheCrownneglected its duty to consult anddidnot adequately address
the Upper Nicola Band’s concerns about their rights.
Table 5.1: Summary of arguments presented by First Nations to the Federal Court of Appeal in
opposition to the TMEP
as Burnaby and Vancouver, whichmay yet wield some power in this conflict, and asmentioned
in the previous section, First Nations may have the strongest case when it comes to opposing
the project. Dealing with and negotiating the balance of power in this conflict could set new
precedents for future projects.
5.2.3 Involved Parties
Several parties are involved in this conflict. Some of the key DMs are identified in the next
sections.
TransMountain
Trans Mountain is committed to constructing the TMEP and still anticipates an in-service date
of 2019 (Kinder Morgan Canada Limited 2017b). As of November 2017, the majority of the
filing to be done by TransMountain regarding the 157 NEB conditions is either under review or
has not yet been completed; many of these are due before certain construction activities can
begin (National Energy Board 2017b). Limited construction on the TMEP began in September
2017 on terminal facilities (Kinder Morgan Canada Limited 2017a).
In an October 2017 press release, Kinder Morgan President Ian Anderson, stated: "Now,
more than ever, this project is critical for our customers and Canada andwe remain committed
to delivering the project in an environmentally responsible way that respects our extensive and
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meaningful consultations with Indigenous Peoples, communities and individuals" (Kinder
Morgan Canada Limited 2017a). This being said, Trans Mountain is eager to proceed without
further delay: according to Kinder Morgan CEO Steve Kean, each month of delay results in
$30 to $35 million in costs for the company, and the project is already nine months behind
schedule (Kinder Morgan Canada Ltd 2017).
Opposition
First Nations groups, environmentalists, and somemunicipalities are strong opponents of the
TMEP. Lawsuits calling for judicial review of the NEB’s initial decision to award the TMEP with
approval certificates have been launched by these groups. In October 2017, arguments were
presented to the Federal Court of Appeal, with consolidated hearings held for 15 appeals filed by
six First Nations groups, the City of Burnaby, BC, the City of Vancouver, BC, and the Raincoast
Conservation Foundation and Living Oceans Society. Furthermore, two judicial reviews in
the BC Supreme Court regarding the provincial government’s issuing of the Environmental
Assessment certificate are scheduled for hearings in November 2017.
Federal Government
The federal government is in favour of the TMEP. Apart from approving the NEB’s recommend-
ation tomove forward with the TMEP, the federal government continues to support the project.
Canadian PrimeMinister Justin Trudeau reaffirmed the government’s support for the TMEP
after the provincial elections in BC. Speaking in Rome, Italy, the PrimeMinister stated: "The
decision we took on the Trans Mountain pipeline was based on facts, evidence on what is
in the best interest of Canadians, and indeed all of Canada" (The Canadian Press 2017; Fife
andMcCarthy 2017). With respect to the impact of BC’s election results on the TMEP, Prime
Minister Trudeau stated: "Regardless of the change in government in British Columbia or
anywhere, the facts and evidence do not change" (The Canadian Press 2017).
Provincial Governments
Although provinces do not have the jurisdictional power to approve or reject pipeline projects,
they can grant or reject provincial permits required for the pipeline’s construction (Hoberg
2013). The provincial governments of Alberta and BC currently hold opposing views on the
TMEP: Alberta supports the project, while BC opposes it.
BC’s stance on the TMEP has flip-flopped over time: the Liberal government headed by
Premier Christy Clark originally opposed the project and did not give its approval until January
2017, when a fiscal deal was struck between the province and Trans Mountain (Polak and
Coleman 2017). Before the May 2017 provincial election, the government of BC continued to
support the TMEP.
The provincial election ultimately resulted in a government formed by 41 members of
the New Democratic Party (NDP) and 3 members of the Green Party, leaving NDP leader
John Horgan as Premier. The two parties signed a Confidence and Supply Agreement, which
included a provision to "Immediately employ every tool available to the new government to
stop the expansion of the KinderMorgan pipeline" (B.C. Green Caucus and B.C. NewDemocrat
Caucus 2017). The BC government is currently an intervenor in the consolidated hearings
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before the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA), arguing that the GIC’s approval of the TMEP did not
include sufficient justification for the decision.
5.3 Conflict Model
In order to conduct an analysis, the conflict described in the preceding sections needs to be
mathematically formalised. This is done using the Option Form which compactly represents a
conflict with multiple DMs and options (Howard 1971).
5.3.1 Decision-makers, Options, and Feasible States
In this section, the DMs and options used to construct the conflict model are discussed.
Table 5.2 details the DMs, their options, and a description of each option in this conflict.
TransMountain
As the corporation responsible for the proposal and construction of the TMEP, Trans Mountain
is a DM. The company has several options available. First, it can make economic concessions
such as fiscal benefits paid to governments or mutual benefit agreements signed with First
Nations in order to make the project more palatable to its opponents. Next, Trans Mountain
can engage in time-intensive concessions such as increased consultation with Indigenous
groups or undergoing additional environmental assessments. Finally, Trans Mountain can
cancel the project altogether.
Government of British Columbia
The BC government can take two broad types of action to oppose the pipeline project. First,
BC can try to use its provincial authority to delay or cancel the project. The province could, for
example, attach additional conditions to the project beyond those decreed by the NEB, decide
to conduct its own environmental assessment of the project, fulfil its constitutional obligation
to consult First Nations before granting provincial permits, or, in a more extreme case, reject
the approval granted by the Liberal government or reject the project altogether (Clogg et al.
2017).
Second, BC could oppose the project by challenging the federal government’s approval of
Trans Mountain. This could be done by joining some of the lawsuits currently before the FCA
and arguing that the federal government was derelict in its duties to consult with First Nations
and to conduct a thorough environmental assessment of the project. Should BC choose neither
of the above two options, it will be considered as a tacit approval of the project.
Additional Decision-makers
In addition to Trans Mountain and the BC government, additional decision-makers were
considered, but ultimately left out of the conflict model. The reasons for this are twofold:
first, as detailed below, the DMs would be limited to pursue a single course of action; second,
each additional feasible state results in a large increase of possible rankings (see Section 4.5.2).
Based on the storage requirements, a maximum number of 11 feasible states (which would
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result in 1622632573 possible rankings) could be handled, which in turn required a smaller set
of DMs. Based on the progression of the conflict until November 2017, Trans Mountain and
the BC government were judged to be the twomost important DMs.
Opposition: This group includes First Nations, environmental groups, andmunicipalities
who are opposed to the TMEP. These groups have similar concerns about the pipeline and
often work together towards their common goals. These groups are firmly opposed to the
project and as such will always deploy legal and other tactics designed to delay or cancel the
project.
Support: This group assembles those in favour of the TMEP, including the provincial govern-
ment of Alberta headed by AndreaHorwath of theNDP and the federal government. Analogous
to the opposition group, this set of DMs will always support the project, though their actions
are usually limited to voicing public support.
Table 5.2: Decision-makers and options for the Trans Mountain conflict
Decision-maker Options Description
Trans Mountain
1. Economic concessions 1: Provide project opponents/crit-ics with economic concessions
0: Do not provide economic con-
cessions
2. Time-intensive concessions (e.g.,
increased consultation, additional
environmental assessments)
1: Engage in time-intensive activit-
ies to appease opponents
0: Do not engage in time-intensive
activities to appease opponents
3. Cancel project 1: Cancel the project0: Continue with the project
BC Government
1. Opposition at provincial level 1: Oppose the pipeline using pro-vincial authority (e.g., denying per-
mits, adding conditions)
0: Do not oppose the project using
provincial authority
2. Opposition at federal level 1: Oppose the project by challen-ging the federal government
0: Do not oppose the project
by challenging the federal govern-
ment
5.3.2 Feasible States
Based on the number of options shown in Table 5.2, there are 25 = 32 possible states; however,
they are not all feasible. First, note that Trans Mountain cannot simultaneously cancel the
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project while taking one or more of its remaining actions. Next, the BC government cannot
oppose the TMEP at either the provincial or federal level if it has been cancelled. Finally, it is
also assumed that it is unlikely that the BC government will oppose the project either at the
federal or provincial level if Trans Mountain makes time-intensive concessions, as these would
go towards addressing the provincial government’s objections. This removes 21 states leaving
11 feasible states in the conflict, which are shown in Option form in Table 5.3 and in graph
form in Figure 5.2.
Table 5.3: Feasible states for the Trans Mountain conflict
DM Options
Trans Mountain
Economic concessions 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Time concessions 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cancel project 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
BC Government Provincial opposition 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1Federal opposition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
State number s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s8 s9 s16 s17 s24 s25
5.4 Inverse EngineeringMethodology
In this section, a brief overview of the ideas underlying the inverse engineeringmethodology is
conducted. The goal of applying the inverse engineering methodology is to provide a DMwith
useful information for future decision-making. A good starting point is to discuss preference
rankings and their role in the process.
5.4.1 Preference Rankings
For the purposes of this analysis, two preference relations exist between two states s1 and s2:
first, one state can be strictly preferred over the other, which is expressed as s1 > s2; second,
the states can be equally preferred, denoted s1 = s2. Preference rankings are orderings of states
that reflect how the DM rates them with respect to each other. As an example of a preference
ranking for the TMEP conflict with the states from Section 5.3.2, consider s25 > s9 = s8 > s16 >
s4 > s3 > s17 > s1 > s0 > s2 = s24. This ranking is read left to right frommost to least preferred
state; it expresses that state s25 is the most preferred state and that states s2 and s24 are tied for
least preferred state.
Given a preference ranking for states, one can associate an ordinal payoff value to each
state. The payoff expresses a state’s ranking compared to the others; a state with a higher payoff
is more preferred to a state with a lower one. For simplicity, since there are eleven states in the
TMEP conflict, the most preferred state receives a payoff of 11, and the payoff decreases by
one each time a less preferred state is encountered. The lowest payoff that a state can have is 1.
Thus, in the preference ranking given above, state s25 has a payoff of 11, states s9 and s8 have a
payoff of 10, state s16 has a payoff of 9, state s4 has a payoff of 8, and so on until states s2 and s24
which have a payoff of 3. It is important to keep in mind that the payoffs are ordinal and as
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Solid lines: BC goverment
Dashed lines: Trans Mountain
Figure 5.2: GraphModel of the TMEP conflict
such do not express any degree of preference; they simply convey the fact that states with a
higher payoff are more preferred to those with lower ones.
Preference rankings are usually determined based on thorough research and/or interviews
with DMs; however, these techniques do not guarantee accurate preference rankings. First-
hand information regarding the DM’s state of mind during the conflict is not always available,
and this is particularly true for historical conflicts. Furthermore, DMsmaynotwish to volunteer
information about their preferences to either an analyst or to otherDMs involved in the dispute.
The inverse engineering methodology aims to assist analysts by observing a DM’s actions
and, on that basis, inferring information about the underlying preference ranking which
prompted such a move. In the context of the current conflict, ascertaining Trans Mountain’s
preference could, for example, allow the BC government to determine how likely it is that the
project will be cancelled (assuming that the provincial government would like the project to be
cancelled). If certain states are less preferred to cancellation, the BC government could steer
the conflict in that direction and eventually have the project cancelled.
At the beginning of the conflict, the list of all possible preference rankings is generated
for the DMwho is the subject of the analysis. As the conflict progresses and observations are
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logged, this list is narrowed and a clearer picture of that DM’s preferences begins to emerge.
The process of removing rankings from the list of possible rankings is done with the help of
behavioural profiles.
5.4.2 Behavioural Profiles
Each behavioural profile aims to capture how a different type of DMmight behave in strategic
interactions. Based on the action observed and on the assumed behavioural profile, the
preference rankings which are inconsistent with these conditions are excluded from the list
of possible rankings. For this case study, the four behavioural profiles described in Chapter 4
(default, Nash, GMR, and SMR) are used to represent four different types of DMs.
5.4.3 Advice Function
The use of preference rankings and behavioural profiles culminates with the ADVICE function.
As discussed in Section 4.5, this function provides the observing DMwith relevant information
based on the evolution of the conflict (Garcia, Obeidi and Hipel 2018).
As will be illustrated in the next section, these results are flexible in that they are designed
to accommodate a variety of decision heuristics by the DM conducting the analysis: a DMmay
be concerned with payoffmaximisation, in which case the expected value would guide their
decision-making; a DMmay worry about sanctioning, in which case the opponent reachable
states would be useful information; or a DMmay wish tomaximise orminimise the probability
of a particular state, in which case the next state probabilities are valuable, to name a few
examples.
5.5 Analysis Results
Based on the conflict model outlined in Section 5.3, an analysis of the situation was performed
using the inverse engineering approach as well as the ADVICE function developed in Chapter 4.
The analysis steps and results are discussed in the following sections.
5.5.1 Setup
This analysis is conducted from the point of view of the BC government, who wishes to choose
optimal actions based on Trans Mountain’s likely preference ranking which is assumed to be
unknown to the BC government. Given the new NDP government’s statements regarding the
TMEP, it is assumed that the government’s most preferred state is that in which the TMEP
is cancelled. Next, the government would like as many concessions as possible on behalf of
Trans Mountain, followed by time concessions, economic concessions, and no concessions.
Within its own set of options, the BC government prefers to take federal opposition rather
than provincial opposition to the project. The government’s preference ranking is as follows:
s4  s3  s2  s1  s17  s9  s25  s16  s8  s24  s0. The government’s payoff for each state is
an integer from one to eleven: the highest ranked state receives the highest payoff (state s4 has
a payoff of 11) and each subsequent state’s payoff is one less that that of the preceding state
(state s3 has a payoff of 10 and so on until state s0, which has a payoff of 1).
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s0 s8 s1 s9
1
2
3
Figure 5.3: Evolution of the Trans Mountain conflict in graph form
5.5.2 Observed Behaviour
In order to apply the inverse engineering approach, it is first necessary to record the DMUMs
through the evolution of the conflict. This is done in Table 5.4, which illustrates the progression
of the TMEP conflict to the present day and in Figure 5.3. At the start of the conflict, the NEB
had just approved the TMEP; none of the DMs had yet made any moves (state s0). Next, the
BC Liberal government voiced its opposition to the project, which was limited to provincial-
level tactics (state s8). Notice that the move from state s0 to state s8 constitutes a unilateral
move by BC since only BC changes its option choice as indicated by the arrow. In response,
Trans Mountain struck a fiscal deal with the Liberal government (state s9), following which the
province changed from opposing the project to supporting it (state s1). This state remained
unchanged until the provincial election (demarcated in the table by a vertical line), after which
the NDP/Green government of BC began to oppose the project at the federal level by joining
some of the lawsuits against the NEB’s original decision (state s9).
Table 5.4: Evolution of the Trans Mountain conflict
DM Options
Trans Mountain
Economic concessions 0 0→ 1 1 1
Time concessions 0 0 0 0 0
Cancel project 0 0 0 0 0
BC Government Provincial opposition 0→ 1 1→ 0→ 1Federal opposition 0 0 0 0 0
State s0 s8 s9 s1 s9
5.5.3 Results and Discussion
Given Trans Mountain’s observed moves (from state s8 to s9, then staying at state s1), the
ADVICE function is called. Table 5.5 details the number of possible rankings remaining after the
algorithms have been run for each behavioural profile. The total number of possible rankings
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is 1 622 632 573; as shown in Table 5.5, this number is reduced, sometimes significantly, after
the ADVICE function is called.
For the Default profile, the logged observations result in 53.15% of the rankings remaining;
the highest percentage of any of the behavioural profiles. This is consistent with the fact that
the default profile was defined to be the least restrictive: it only uses one criterion for removing
rankings. The other behavioural profiles result in a steeper decrease of the number of possible
rankings to 10% or less of the original number. Given that the original number of possible
rankings is in the order of one billion, there still remain a significant number of rankings
(approximately in the order of 100 million) for Nash, GMR, and SMR profiles.
Thus, in contrast to the sustainable development conflict discussed in Chapter 4, the
number of possible rankings after the algorithms have been run is too high to produce a
tractable list that might be useful to the observing DM. However, as the next sections will
illustrate, the information gleaned from the ADVICE function remains highly relevant and
valuable.
Table 5.5: Number of rankings remaining after all observations have been entered into the
ADVICE function
Behavioural Profile Number of possible
rankings
Percentage of rankings
remaining
Default 862 440 068 53.15%
Nash 139 011 332 8.567%
GMR 98 687 972 6.08%
SMR 163 413 156 10.07%
Default Profile
First, note that from state s1 (Trans Mountain makes economic concessions, government
mounts no opposition), the BC government can expect a payoff of at least 7 if it chooses to stay
at state s1, or move to either state s9 (provincial opposition) or to state s17 (federal opposition).
A move to state s25 (provincial and federal opposition) would result in a lower expected value
at the immediate next step (i.e., when Trans Mountain counter-moves). The expected value
information is provided so that the DM has a rough idea of what is likely to occur at the next
step; for DMs who prefer to maximise their payoff at each turn, this information is highly
valuable.
Looking beyond the expected value, the BC government can also see in more detail how
Trans Mountain is likely to respond to its move. For instance, if it chooses to remain at state s1,
it is most likely that Trans Mountain will also remain at that state. In fact, any move by the BC
government ismost likely to bemirrored by TransMountain. Based on this information, the BC
government can be somewhat reassured with respect to the possibility of sanctioning by Trans
Mountain; since Trans Mountain is likely to stay in whatever state to which the government
moves, the threat of sanctioning is diminished.
If the BC government has a particular end result in mind (e.g., cancellation of the TMEP
– state s4), it is also possible to see which of its moves makes this state more likely. Although
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cancellation is not the most likely response for Trans Mountain at any of the BC government’s
moves, the highest probability of cancellation occurs if the BC government moves to either
state s9 (25%), state s17 (26%), or state s25 (26%). On the other hand, if the BC government
wishes to avoid a particular state at any cost (e.g., state s0, its least preferred state), the next
state probabilities show that any move away from state s1 makes state s0 unreachable for Trans
Mountain. The results for the ’default’ behavioural profile are summarized in Table 5.6.
State Expected payoff
value
Counter-move
probabilities
TransMountain’s
reachable states
s1 7.83
s0 = 17%
s0, s1, s2, s3, s4
s1 = 32%
s2 = 17%
s3 = 17%
s4 = 17%
s9 7.02
s4 = 25%
s4, s8, s9s8 = 8%
s9 = 67%
s17 7.26
s4 = 26%
s4, s16, s17s16 = 26%
s17 = 48%
s25 5.77
s4 = 26%
s4, s24, s25s24 = 26%
s25 = 48%
Table 5.6: Results of theADVICE function for the BC government after observing TransMountain
move from state s8 to state s9, then staying at state s1 and assuming a default behavioural profile
Nash Profile
Recall that a DMwith a Nash profile is not concerned with risk and has low foresight. DMs who
behave according to this profile never move to a less preferred state and remain at states which
are Nash stable. Given these assumptions, the results obtained from the ADVICE function are
different than those from the previous profile. The results for the Nash behavioural profile are
summarized in Table 5.7.
It is now certain that Trans Mountain will also choose to remain at state s1 and at state s9
if the BC government does so. However, Trans Mountain’s response to the BC government
moving to either state s17 or to state s25 is less certain than it was under the default profile
assumption. Although the likelihood of cancellation is decreased compared to the default
results, the probabilities that Trans Mountain will choose either of its remaining two options
are more equal. Depending on the government’s level of risk aversion, they may or may not
wish to move to state s17 or to state s25.
Again, the information provided can be used in many ways to assist the BC government in
its decision-making. Given the BC government’s assumed preference ranking, its best move is
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to remain at state s1 if the goal is to maximise its payoff. However, if the government would like
cancellation to be a possibility, it may opt to move to either state s17 or to state s25, taking a
short-term disimprovement with the eventual goal of reaching its most preferred state. Note
that in this case, the government’s least preferred state (state s0) is not a possibility since it is
certain that Trans Mountain will remain at state s1 and not move to any of the reachable states
from there. This is useful for the government to know, since the possibility of sanctioning to
state s0 is no longer a concern.
State Expected payoff
value
Counter-move
probabilities
TransMountain’s
reachable states
s1 8 s1 = 100% s0, s1, s2, s3, s4
s9 6 s9 = 100% s4, s8, s9
s17 6.53
s4 = 18%
s4, s16, s17s16 = 39%
s17 = 43%
s25 4.88
s4 = 18%
s4, s24, s25s24 = 39%
s25 = 43%
Table 5.7: Results of theADVICE function for the BC government after observing TransMountain
move from state s8 to state s9, then staying at state s1 and assuming a Nash behavioural profile
GMRProfile
DMs whomove according to the GMR profile are concerned with possible opponent sanction-
ing and as such are more risk averse than any of the previous behavioural profiles. Assuming
that Trans Mountain is this type of DM yields the results shown in Table 5.8.
Note that moving to state s17 (federal opposition) now has the highest expected value for
the government, followed by staying at state s1. The only certainty in this case is that Trans
Mountain will remain at state s1 if the BC government does so. Interestingly, a move away
from state s1 results in a 26% chance of cancellation, regardless of whether the BC government
moves to state s9, s17, or s25; should the government wish to keep the possibility of cancellation
alive, it can move to any of its reachable states from state s1. Also note that states s8, s16, and
s24 are unlikely to occur: these are states in which Trans Mountain offers neither economic
nor time concessions. In other words, given these results, the BC government does not have
to worry about Trans Mountain reversing the economic concessions given to the previous
government.
In planning its next move, the BC government could, for example, wish to maximise its
expected payoff by moving to state s17. It may prefer certainty and choose to remain at state s1,
or decide that pursuing cancellation is important and move to either state s9, s17, or s25.
68
5.5. Analysis Results
State Expected payoff
value
Counter-move
probabilities
TransMountain’s
reachable states
s1 8 s1 = 100% s0, s1, s2, s3, s4
s9 7.31 s4 = 26% s4, s8, s9s9 = 74%
s17 8.05 s4 = 26% s4, s16, s17s17 = 74%
s25 6.58 s4 = 26% s4, s24, s25s25 = 74%
Table 5.8: Results of theADVICE function for the BC government after observing TransMountain
move from state s8 to state s9, then staying at state s1 and assuming a GMR behavioural profile
SMR Profile
Recall that DMs with an SMR behavioural profile move with three steps in mind: their initial
move, their opponent’s counter-move, and their response. As such, these DMs have the most
foresight out of all of the behavioural profiles and are also risk averse. Assuming that Trans
Mountain is this type of DM yields the results shown in Table 5.9.
In this case, the government remaining at state s1 ensures that Trans Mountain will do the
same. Looking at expected values, remaining at state s1 yields the highest payoff. Should the
BC government move to state s9, Trans Mountain will likely remain at state s9, but there is a
26% probability that the project will be cancelled. If the government chooses to move to state
s17 or to state s25, then the likelihood of cancellation of the project increases to 32%. As was the
case with the GMR profile, states 8, 16, and 24 have no possibility of occurring; this eases any
concerns that the BC government might have about sanctioning.
State Expected payoff
value
Counter-move
probabilities
TransMountain’s
reachable states
s1 8 s1 = 100% s0, s1, s2, s3, s4
s9 7.31 s4 = 26% s4, s8, s9s9 = 74%
s17 7.39
s4 = 32%
s4, s16, s17s16 = 30%
s17 = 38%
s25 6.03
s4 = 32%
s4, s24, s25s24 = 30%
s25 = 38%
Table 5.9: Results of theADVICE function for the BC government after observing TransMountain
move from state s8 to state s9, then staying at state s1 and assuming a Nash behavioural profile
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In addition to examining the results for each behavioural profile, it is also useful to compare
the results across all of the profiles. In doing so, one can notice that increasing TransMountain’s
risk aversion increases the probability of cancellation. In other words, the more risk-averse
Trans Mountain, the more likely it is to cancel the project. The behavioural profile assigned to
the opponent should thus be chosen carefully so as to obtain the most relevant results; in this
case, the BC government, may, from previous experiences, have an idea of Trans Mountain’s
level of risk aversion and act accordingly.
5.6 Chapter Summary
By leveraging the informationprovidedbyobservable opponentmoves, the inverse engineering
method allows the observing DM (in this case, the BC government) to refine the list of possible
opponent’s preferences and, most importantly, to use this information to improve their own
decision-making process. This is done with the assistance of the ADVICE function, which
gives the DM the expected value of each of its possible moves, the probabilities regarding the
opponent’s counter-move, as well as which states are reachable by the opponent.
With this information in hand, the DM running the analysis (BC government, in this case
study) can choose which action is in their best interest. What constitutes the DM’s "best
interest" is at their discretion; the power of the ADVICE function lies in the fact that it provides
the DMwith relevant data which the DM can then use to make more informed decisions. For
example, a DMmay wish to maximise their expected payoff at the immediate next step, to
have the highest probability for their most preferred state, to have the lowest probability for
their least preferred state, or to take some risk of sanctioning, or follow some other decision
heuristic. The output of the ADVICE function is flexible enough to accommodate a variety of
decision-making rules and as such is a valuable addition to a DM’s toolkit.
Applied to the TMEP conflict, the newmethodology provides interesting insights. Under
the default profile which has the least restrictive assumptions, the highest expected value
occurs at state s1 (Trans Mountain makes economic concessions), while the highest likelihood
of cancellation occurs when the BC government moves to either state s17 (Trans Mountain
makes economic concessions, BC government opposes at federal level) or to state s25 (Trans
Mountain makes economic concessions, BC government opposes at federal and provincial
levels). If Trans Mountain is assumed to have a Nash profile, state s1 also has the highest
expected value; however, the possibility of cancellation is only conserved by a move to state
s17 or to state s25. When the GMR profile is assumed, state s17 now has the highest expected
value and is tied with states s9 (Trans Mountain makes economic concessions, BC government
opposes at provincial level) and s25 for highest likelihood of cancellation. Finally, when Trans
Mountain’s behavioural profile is assumed to be SMR, state s1 has the highest expected value
and the highest probability of cancellation occurs in states s17 and s25.
Once again, note that the results obtained are amenable to a variety of decision-making
heuristics. The BC government may wish to maximise its expected value, to cancel the project,
or to avoid sanctioning, for example; in fact, it is not necessary for the BC government to always
follow the same decision-making rules at each call of the function. As its name implies, the
ADVICE function’s main purpose is to provide relevant information on the basis of which the
DM conducting the analysis can make informed decisions.
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Future research will explore additional behavioural profiles to the ones used in this case
study. The new behavioural profiles could be founded on additional solution concepts from
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution Methodology or based on other decision-making
heuristics. Additional output from the ADVICE function will also be explored to further enhance
the information it provides to DMs.
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Conclusions and Future Research
The goals of this research are to innovate with respect to mathematical solution concepts
and to provide a way forward in the analysis of a conflict in the absence of any preference
information from opponents. To these ends, a new family of solution concepts, initial state
stabilities, was defined in Chapter 3, while the inverse engineering approach was introduced
in Chapters 4 and 5. As will be discussed shortly (Section 6.2.3) these contributions can be
nicely integrated.
6.1 Research Contributions
As alluded to above, this work set out to answer twomotivating questions:
1. What are other ways to define stability for a state?
2. What can one do if one has no preference information about DMs?
6.1.1 In answer to Q1: What are other ways to define stability for a state?
This question is motivated by a desire to expand the range of DM behaviours that can be
mathematically modelled in strategic interactions. As suggested by the literature, capturing
different types of behaviours provides DMs and analysts with additional insights into possible
resolutions and evolutions of a conflict. The family of initial state stabilities was defined to
answer this question: rather than comparing the states which are reachable by opponents from
the set of UIs as all of the common GraphModel solution concepts do, comparing reachable
states by opponents from the set of UIs as well as from the initial state provides an alternate
way to define stability. Chapter 3 delved into how initial state stabilities are defined as well as
their applicability to real-world disputes.
The starting point of this chapter is the idea of including opponent reachable states from
the starting state in stability determination. This approach is different from that used in the
standardGraphModel analysis and allows one to explore the future consequences of remaining
at a given starting state. From here, the concept of an initial state, which is then used to define
initial state stability, was introduced. Initial state stabilities thus take into account how the
conflict evolves both from the focal DM’s available UIs and from the initial state.
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Next, a total of four new solution concepts: pessimistic initial state stability (PIS), optimistic
initial state stability (OIS), sequentially pessimistic initial state stability (SPIS), and sequentially
optimistic initial state stability (SOIS) were defined for n-DM conflicts. The optimistic solution
concepts (OIS, SOIS) model DMs who are interested in comparing best-case scenarios, while
the pessimistic solution concepts (PIS, SPIS) compare worst-case outcomes. A further distinc-
tion is drawn between PIS/OIS and SPIS/SOIS based on whether the opponent’s UMs or UIs
are considered.
The latter half of the chapter provided formal proofs relating the family of new solution
concepts to existing GraphModel solution concepts and to each other. In special cases, there
is equivalence between some of the standard Graph Model concepts and the initial state
stabilities as well as equivalence among initial state stabilities. The Elmira conflict was used
as a case study to demonstrate the applicability of the new solution concepts as well as the
insights they can provide to DMs and analysts.
6.1.2 In answer to Q2: What can one do if one has no preference information
about DMs?
This question is motivated by the fact that preferences can be difficult to obtain. This can
occur when DMs are not willing to share their preferences or in historical conflicts when there
may be a lack of information. As it turns out, meaningful insights and information can be
gathered even when DM preferences are unknown. The inverse engineering approach uses a
DM’s observable actions to infer preference information and to produce useful strategic advice.
The theoretical approach introduced in Chapter 4 and demonstrated in Chapter 5 allows for
the calculation of expected payoff values and probabilities of counter-moves which can in turn
be used by the observing DM to make strategic decisions on how to proceed.
Chapter 4 focused on the introduction of the inverse engineering methodology and its
associated algorithms. The key idea behind the methodology is that of leveraging observable
behaviour to infer preference information. This idea in turn rests on Revealed Preference
Theory and on its heuristic value to model development.
With the idea of using observed behaviour in mind, it is necessary to define behavioural
profiles which dictate how the observed DM is making decisions. The behavioural profiles
introduced so far are based on GraphModel solution concepts (Nash, GMR, and SMR) and on
utility maximisation (Default). These behavioural profiles reflect the types of DMs which are
commonly analysed andmodelled in conflicts.
Next, the algorithms for the removal of infeasible rankings based on a DM’s behavioural
profile (Default, Nash, GMR, SMR) and on their observed actions were detailed. Beginning
with the list of all possible rankings, the algorithms remove those which are inconsistent with
both the observed behaviour and the observed DM’s behavioural profile. For smaller conflicts,
it is possible to narrow the list of possible rankings to a tractable size; this is not always possible
for conflicts with a larger number of states.
The removal of infeasible rankings is taken a step further with the ADVICE function which
provides the expected value of the state, the counter-move probabilities, and the opponent
reachable states to aid real-time decision-making. This information is useful to the observing
DM when they are deciding on their next move as it provides them with a glimpse of what
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effect their decisionmight have in the future. As its name implies, the ADVICE function ismeant
to provide the focal DMwith information only, leaving the final decision up to the DM.
At the end of Chapter 4, a simple 2-DM sustainable development conflict was used as a
case study. In this conflict, the total number of possible rankings (75) is small enough to result
in a shortlist of rankings for the developers.
Chapter 5 applied the ideas and concepts from the previous chapter to the Kinder Mor-
gan pipeline conflict. Conducted from the point of view of the BC government, the conflict
started with a total of 1 622 632 573 possible rankings for Trans Mountain. After logging Trans
Mountain’s observed behaviour and running the ADVICE function for each behavioural profile,
this list was greatly reduced. The discussion highlighted the usefulness and flexibility of the
data provided by the ADVICE function, which is well suited to a variety of decision-making
heuristics.
6.2 Future Research
6.2.1 Bridging the Research Questions
An interesting research avenue is the bridging of the research strands that underlie this work.
This canbedoneby incorporating the four initial state stabilities as behavioural profiles into the
inverse engineering methodology. Thus, in addition to the behavioural profiles that have been
developed in this work, PIS, SPIS, OIS, and SOIS profiles would also be available. Enriching
the set of behavioural profiles will capture a greater variety of human behaviour in conflict
situations and widen the applicability of the inverse methodology.
6.2.2 Initial State Stabilities
Initial state stability is a useful addition to the metarational solution concept family. Future
research will explore the possibility of operationalising these calculations. Furthermore, al-
though the new solution concepts have here been definedwith one opponent response allowed
(i.e., looking one move ahead), the underlying idea can, with a few additional definitions and
notions, be extended to apply to an arbitrary number of opponent responses. The generalised
metarationalities framework ( Zeng et al. 2006; Zeng et al. 2007) extends GraphModel solution
concepts to an arbitrary number of rounds; a similar generalisation could be applied to these
new solution concepts.
6.2.3 Inverse Engineering
Future work in this area can explore and develop additional behavioural profiles. Those
presented here are derived from the most commonly used stability concepts from the Graph
Model methodology; expanding the range of behavioural profiles is thus an important project.
With regards to the preferences themselves, itmay be interesting to explore other preference
structures such as those used for uncertain preferences or strength of preferences mentioned
in Chapter 4. The current assumption of transitive preferences might also be possible to relax.
Another area of research lies in enhancing the ADVICE function and algorithms in terms of
computational complexity and, in the case of the ADVICE function, of its output. Demonstrating
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and fine-tuning the scalability of the methods and algorithms is an important next step for
eventual integration into a DSS. A possible solution to reducing the computational complexity
due to the large number of feasible preference rankings is removing certain infeasible rankings
even before any moves are observed. This is possible for conflicts in which one has some
information regarding the opponents’ preferences (e.g. perhaps one state cannot be the most
preferred state; any rankings with this characteristic can therefore be removed at the start).
Furthermore, in addition to the information that the ADVICE function currently provides to
DMs, its output could also include items such as the probability of sanctioning (i.e., how likely
it is that the focal DM’s move will be sanctioned at the immediate next step).
Extracting useful information from the potentially high number of remaining rankings
is also another research avenue. This would be particularly useful for conflicts with a large
nunmber of possible rankings such as the one detailed in Chapter 5. It may be, for example,
that the remaining rankings have certain characteristics in common (e.g., a particular state is
always the most preferred; another state is always ranked 5th or lower, etc.). When this occurs,
it would be helpful for DMs and analysts to be able to extract these commonalities from the
(long) list of possible rankings. Such information would nicely complement the data from the
ADVICE function and assist in decision-making.
The method is also well poised to tie-in with the Graph Model itself as it aids DMs and
modellers to develop accurate preference rankings for opponents. A particularly interesting
application is the coupling of these methods and algorithms with the inverse approach to
the GraphModel which provides DMs and analysts with the preferences required to lead to a
particular state (Kinsara, Kilgour and Hipel 2014). DMs and analysts wishing for the conflict
to result in a particular state could consult the inverse GraphModel decision support system
and obtain the list of preferences that each DMmust have to bring this result to fruition; the
methods provided in this work would complement this information by verifying whether the
generated preferences are feasible given the DMs’ behaviour.
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